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NOTES
Antitrust Law-Private Actions: The Supreme
Court Bars Treble-Damage Suits by Indirect Purchasers
In section four of the Clayton Act1 Congress provided that parties
injured as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws could bring a private
action for treble damages against an antitrust violator. 2 When the violation
involves price-fixing, 3 the consumer 4 of the product is often the one who
bears the additional cost resulting from the overcharge. Because of the
multilevel distribution system employed for the sale of most products in the
United States, however, the higher price resulting from a price-fixing
violation is commonly passed on by intervening purchasers before it reaches
the ultimate consumer. Since 1968, when the Supreme Court held that
defendants in treble-damage actions could not assert in defense that a direct
purchaser-plaintiff had passed on any overcharge to its customers and thus
had not been damaged by the alleged violation, 5 the courts have disagreed 6
on whether that decision should be extended to bar a claim of pass-on7 by a
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2. The provision for recovery of treble damages was seen as both a remedial provision
and as an incentive to private suits, and thereby an aid to enforcement of the antitrust laws. See
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (Marshall, J.).
3. See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the ConsumerInterest: The Fallacy of Parens
Patriaeand A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976). Of the 346 civil and criminal
actions initiated during 1971-1976 by the Department of Justice, 192 involved horizontal pricefixing (agreements among competitors), and 4 concerned vertical price-fixing, or resale price
maintenance. Id. at 536, 555 (citing TRADE REG. REP. (CCII) for the five year period). Since
treble-damage actions are frequently commenced after a government prosecution for the same
violation, these figures are also a relatively accurate indication of the trend in private actions.
Id. at 634 n.42.
4. The word "consumer" as used in this Note refers to any individual or business entity
buying a product primarily for use rather than for resale. The term "ultimate consumer" or
"final purchaser" refers to the last buyer of a product that has passed through several other
hands-commonly those of the wholesaler and retailer. "Indirect purchaser" refers to anyone
who buys a product from someone other than the manufacturer.
5. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 21-24 infra.
6. Compare text accompanying notes 25-29 with text accompanying notes 30-35.
7. "Pass-on" refers to the theory that an overcharge added to the cost of a product at one
level of the chain of distribution, rather than being absorbed by the buyer at that level, is added
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plaintiff in a treble-damage suit. Contrary to the predictions of most commentators8 and many lower courts, 9 the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois 0 has answered that question in the affirmative. Since any prospective plaintiff except the first purchaser of a product must rely on the passon theory to allege an injury from an illegal overcharge, Illinois Brick
appears to have barred treble-damage suits by all indirect purchasers.
The State of Illinois and 700 other governmental entities brought suit
against defendant brick manufacturers, alleging violations of section one of
the Sherman Act. 11 Plaintiffs claimed that the arbitrarily high price for
concrete blocks illegally fixed by the manufacturers had been passed on by
the masonry contractors to the general contractors and again by the general

contractors to plaintiffs. 2 Defendant manufacturers moved for summary
judgment against all indirect purchasers of the concrete block. The district

court granted the motion, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing, 3 but the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 14 The Supreme Court, on
on to the price paid by the next buyer in the chain. Assertion of the theory by a plaintiff in a
treble-damage suit is labelled "offensive use of pass-on"; when invoked by a defendant it is a
"defensive use of pass-on." See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2064-65
(1977).
8. See, e.g., McGuire, The Passing-OnDefense and the Right of Remote Purchasersto
Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PTt. L. REV. 177 (1971); Comment,
Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-on, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976
(1975); Note, Mangano and Ultimate ConsumerStanding:The Misuse of the HanoverDoctrine,
72 COLUM. L. Rev. 394 (1972); Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the
Passing-onDoctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1972). But see Handler & Blechman, supra note 3,
at 638-49.
9. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975); In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub norn. Standard Oil
Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971);
Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977).
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975), provides in pertinent part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
12. 97 S.Ct. at 2065. Defendants' blocks were bought primarily by masonry contractors,
who built masonry structures under contract to general contractors, who then incorporated
those structures into entire buildings that were sold to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed $3 million in
actual damages, producing a treble-damage claim of $9 million.
1975). The district court ruled
13. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. I11.
that plaintiffs were too remote from the alleged violation to have standing to sue under § 4 of the
Clayton Act because they were indirect purchasers of a product that, after being sold with the
illegal overcharge by the manufacturer, had been incorporated into another product and sold in
a different form. Id. at 468. The court distinguished between "final" consumers, who buy
goods indirectly but in the same condition as when they were originally made and sold, from
"ultimate" consumers, who buy the finished product from a middleman who has altered or
added to the goods. Id. at 467-68. Final consumers, the court noted, were usually granted
standing, ultimate ones only rarely. Id. at 466.
14. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976). The court of appeals also
based its holding on the standing question, but stressed that the broad language of the Clayton
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certiorari, did not reach the standing question, but held that HanoverShoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.15 was dispositive of the case.16 Justice
White, writing for the Court, 17 rejected both the argument that plaintiffs
should be permitted to use a pass-on theory" and the contention that
HanoverShoe should be read narrowly to bar the pass-on defense only in its
own factual context of overcharges for capital goods. 19 Instead, he enunciated a per se rule against the use of pass-on theory by any indirect
20
purchaser.
In Hanover Shoe, the most significant prior case dealing with the use

of pass-on theory, 21 the Supreme Court was confronted with the question
whether a defendant in a treble-damage action should be allowed to escape

liability to a direct purchaser by proving that the alleged illegal overcharge
had been passed along to the purchaser's customers.2 2 The Court, pointing
Act's treble damage provision demanded a more liberal test of standing than the district court
had applied. The standing test should not be used, the Seventh Circuit declared, to bar a
plaintiff who might have difficulty proving its injury. Id. at 1165-66.
15. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2066 n.7.
17. Justice White was also the author of the HanoverShoe opinion. 392 U.S. at 483.
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2067. This position was taken by the dissenters, Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, the United States as amicus curiae and the lower courts that had
allowed other plaintiffs to use the pass-on theory. Id.
19. This position was argued solely by plaintiffs. Id. at 2066.
20. Id. at 2070. Two limited exceptions to this rule were recognized by the Court. The first
exception, coinciding with the sole exception created in HanoverShoe, 392 U.S. at 494, applies
when a first purchaser has a pre-existing cost-plus contract with its customer, thus establishing
the effect of the overcharge in advance and simplifying the problems of proof. 97 S. Ct. at 2070.
The second exception arises when "the direct purchaser is owned or controlled -by its
customer." Id. at 2070 n.16. But see notes 50 & 51 and text accompanying notes 49-51 infra.
21. Prior to Hanover Shoe, lower courts were divided on the question whether to recognize the pass-on defense. The defense was allowed in the "Oil Jobber Cases," in which
plaintiffs, independent jobbers who bought gas from defendant oil companies, resold it to
service stations at a resale price uniformly fixed according to costs. See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin
Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Leonard
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th
Cir. 1942). In the "Electrical Cases," however, where defendant electrical equipment manufacturers sought to prove that plaintiff utility companies had passed on overcharges in the price of
the equipment to its customers, the defense was denied. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1963); Public Util. Dist. No. I v. General Elec.
Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
In contrast, pre-Hanover Shoe courts generally allowed the use of pass-on theory by
plaintiffs. See, e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th
Cir. 1967); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1967);
Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
22. Plaintiff Hanover Shoe claimed that defendant United Shoe Machinery, through
its policy of leasing rather than selling machinery, had monopolized the shoe industry and
had forced Hanover to pay more for the machinery than it would have paid under normal
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to the "insurmountable" problems of proving pass-on in most situations and
noting the added complications to treble-damage actions such problems
would entail,13 held that the pass-on defense was barred as a matter of law.
The Court also emphasized the need to preserve the effectiveness of the
treble-damage action as an enforcement and deterrence mechanism: if a
violator could defend against a first purchaser by asserting pass-on, it would
escape liability altogether, since often ultimate consumers would have only
a small stake in any lawsuit that could be brought against a violator and,
24
accordingly, little incentive to sue.
The Hanover Shoe opinion offered little insight into the Court's views
on the use of pass-on by plaintiffs. This question divided the lower courts
for several years. One group of cases, led by Mangano v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. ,25 read Hanover Shoe as barring
indirect purchasers from asserting injury through pass-on. In support of its
ruling, the lower court in Manganopointed to the Hanover Court's concern
with the difficulties of proving pass-on. 26 Plaintiffs in Mangano claimed
that the overcharge had passed through as many as five levels from the
manufacturer of plumbing fixtures to the wholesaler, to the plumbing
contractor, to the builder, to the first homeowner, and often to a subsequent
homeowner. 27 Noting the difficulty of proving that a builder selling a
$20,000-$30,000 house had raised his price to reflect a $10-$20 overcharge
for plumbing fixtures, the court dismissed the indirect purchasers' complaint.28 Other courts that rejected claims by ultimate consumers, rather than
basing their ruling on Hanover Shoe, viewed the issue as one of standing.
Those who sought to show an injury several levels removed from the alleged
violation were held to be too remote to have a sufficient interest to sue under
29
section four.
competitive conditions. United contended that Hanover had suffered no actual injury from the
overcharge because it was fully reflected in the price of the shoes sold to its customers. 392
U.S. at 487.
23. Id. at 493.

24. Id. at 494.
25. 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator &

Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Donson Stores, Inc. v.
American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Travis v. Fairmount Foods Co., 346 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
26. 50 F.R.D. at 25-26.

27. Id. at 19-20.
28. Id. at 26. Defendants' motion to dismiss was based on plaintiffs' failure to file answers
to its interrogatories. The motion was granted on this ground, but the district court stated in
addition that HanoverShoe required dismissal because it had barred the use of pass-on by all
parties. Id. at 30. The court of appeals affirmed on both grounds. 438 F.2d at 1188.
29. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975) (residential
subscribers claimed they paid higher rates as a result of anticompetitive practices in the
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In another line of cases, lower courts concluded that Hanover Shoe
was not intended to bar suits by ultimate consumers. These courts empha-,
sized the policy underlying that decision and maintained that barring plaintiffs' claims either under Hanover Shoe or on the basis of a strict rule of
standing would subvert the purpose of the section four treble-damage action. 30 In the leading case in this area, In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases,3 '1plaintiffs were governmental entities claiming that asphalt producers had illegally raised and maintained the price of liquid asphalt used in
the construction of public roads. The asphalt was bought from defendants by
32
contractors, who combined it with other ingredients in building the roads.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the consumers in that
case had a substantial interest in the suit, since three million tons of asphalt
and thirty-seven thousand contracts were involved. Furthermore, few of the
contractors involved had come forward to assert their own claim against the
supplier. 33 Nor were they likely to do so, the court reasoned, because of
their dependence upon the supplier and the apparent financial control that it
exerted over many of its contractors. 34 The court noted that "[tihe day is
long past when courts, particularly federal courts, will deny relief to a
because of procedural difficulties or problems of
deserving plaintiff merely
35
apportioning damages."
In Illinois Brick, however, it was the HanoverShoe Court's resolve to
control the complexities of antitrust litigation that determined the outcome
of the case. The other principles espoused in Hanover Shoe-ensuring
enforcement and punishing violators of the antitrust laws- were de-emphasized. Rejecting the argument that offensive use of a pass-on theory should
telephonic equipment market); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.

1973) (farmers claimed damage to crop yields as a result of conspiracy among auto manufactur-

ers to eliminate competition in air pollution control devices); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (purchasers of finished animal feed products containing an
antibiotic drug asserted a claim against manufacturers of the drug); United Egg Producers v.
Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consumers of eggs claimed injury from
anticompetitive practices of egg producers).

30. See, e.g., Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976);
1973); In re Master Key Antitrust
Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill.
Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas.

Indus., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas.

74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule

74,484 (S.D. Fla., 1972); cases cited note 9 supra.

31. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415

U.S. 919 (1974).
32. Id. at 194.

33. Id. at 198.
34. Ird.
35. Id. at 201. See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (approving a
settlement plan involving 66 civil antitrust actions and apportioning damages between direct and
indirect purchasers).
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be permitted, Justice White first asserted that in order to promote consistency in adjudications the Hanover Shoe rule must apply equally to plaintiffs
and defendants. 36 He then cited two more practical concerns that impelled
the outcome in Illinois Brick. First, he expressed the fear that if indirect as
well as direct purchasers were allowed to recover, defendants would be
exposed to a "serious risk of multiple liability." 3 7 Second, Justice White
reiterated the Hanover Shoe Court's apprehension that the attempt to prove
pass-on would "greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of already
protracted treble-damage proceedings.'"38
The Court attributed its reluctance to abandon the Hanover Shoe rule
or apply it only to instances of overcharges for capital goods, as plaintiffs
proposed, both to stare decisis considerations and to its unchanged belief
that the Hanover Shoe construction of section four would provide the most
effective enforcement mechanism for the antitrust laws. 39 Moreover, although the risk to defendants of multiple liability would not be present under
this application of Hanover Shoe,4° the Court foresaw additional complications that would arise if all potential plaintiffs were permitted to assert
41
claims based upon a single overcharge.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Brennan 42 argued that the majority
had overemphasized the importance of efficiency in the resolution of antitrust litigation, since the underlying rationale of the Hanover Shoe decision-the need to promote the treble-damage action as a deterrent to antitrust violators 43---called for permitting plaintiffs to assert pass-on. The
ensuing procedural and evidentiary complications and the risk of multiple
liability, Brennan argued, could be adequately resolved by means of procedural devices, whereas prohibiting offensive use of pass-on would frustrate Congress' purpose in passing the Clayton Act, by reducing the ability
44
of injured parties to obtain compensation.
36. 97 S. Ct. at 2067.
37. Id.

38. Id. at 2068.
39. Id. at 2070.
40. Compare text accompanying note 37 supra. When a defendant is allowed to assert

pass-on by the intervening purchasers and is able to prove it, the defendant will be liable only to
the final purchaser.

41. 97 S. Ct. at 2070. The existence of several potential claimants against the defendant,
and the necessity of apportioning any recovery among them, would require compulsory joinder
of all the claimants in a single action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19. This joinder requirement, the
Court feared, "would transform treble-damage actions into massive multiparty litigations
involving many levels of distribution and including large classes of ultimate consumers remote
from the defendant." 97 S. Ct. at 2072.

42. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
97 S. Ct. at 2076.

43. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
44. 97 S. Ct. at 2083-84 (dissenting opinion).
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In this respect the primary purposes of section four of the Clayton Act
are of critical importance in guiding any evaluation of the Illinois Brick
result. The first objective of the Act is to provide compensation: "Any
person who shall be injured .
by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" may sue to recover his damages.45 The fact that a claimant
may recover treble damages, however, indicates a second purpose of the
Act-the punishment of violators and the deterrence of future violations.
Finally, efficiency in administration may be regarded as an inherent goal of
the Act; presumably Congress intended that its two substantive goals would
be implemented swiftly and economically, as well as justly.
In Illinois Brick, the Court appeared chiefly concerned that antitrust
litigation be conducted as efficiently as possible, citing this rationale as the
dispositive principle of the Hanover Shoe decision. Justice White maintained that its importance was evident from the fact that the Court had
recognized an exception to the general Hanover Shoe rule for suits based on
pre-existing cost-plus contracts, contracts that make it " 'easy to prove' "
that the direct purchaser has not been damaged by an antitrust violation. 46 It
is also true, however, that when there is a cost-plus contract, the direct
purchaser has the least incentive to sue, while the indirect consumer's injury
is obvious and he is more likely to assert a claim. Thus the exception also
furthers the enforcement objective of the Act. Moreover, if ease of proof
was the reason for allowing the cost-plus exception, one might expect that
the Illinois Brick Court would have allowed other exceptions for situations
in which the "difficulties and uncertainties" of proving pass-on would be
comparatively slight. Justice White, however, specifically rejected other,
proposed exceptions4 7 on the grounds that some difficulty of proof might
45. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2068 n. 12 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494) (emphasis added by the
Illinois Brick Court).
47. Plaintiffs argued that exceptions should be allowed when middlemen resell goods
without altering them and when contractors add a fixed percentage markup to their costs in
submitting bids. Exceptions were also urged for other situations in which most of the overcharge would logically be passed on-specifically, when "a price-fixed good is a small but vital
input into a much larger product, making the demand for the price-fixed good highly inelastic."
Id. at 2074.
At least two of these exceptions deserved further consideration by the Court. When
contractors, or retailers, add a fixed percentage markup to their costs, any overcharge incurred
is promptly passed on. Though the extent of the markup may vary with demand conditions,
demand is likely to be inelastic where such a pricing system is being employed; otherwise
profits would decline. Furthermore, expert testimony may be employed to provide estimates of
the elasticity of demand. See Schaeffer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions:An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883,905,916 (1975). Proof of
pass-on would be simplified in that once the amount of the overcharge is proved, and the
percentage markup being employed by the middleman is established, the price change that is
due to the overcharge can be determined. The fact that this pricing system, if the percentage
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remain and that "the process of classifying various market situations according to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved and its susceptibility
to proof in a judicial forum would entail the very problems that the Hanover
Shoe rule was meant to avoid." 8
The only additional exception acknowledged by Justice White, however, could create as many problems of classification as those he rejected.
After explaining the rationale for the cost-plus exception, he noted :
Another situation in which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct
purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer. Cf. Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 199 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974).49

The exception as stated is somewhat ambiguous; although it concerns
control of a direct purchaser by its customer, the cases cited describe
situations in which a purchaser is controlled by its supplier.50 Since the fact
that free "market forces have been superseded" in some manner appears to
have supplied the rationale for the exception, perhaps Justice White intended to distinguish situations in which control is exerted over a direct purchaser by either its customer or its supplier. 5 1 However it is interpreted, the
markup is fixed, results in greater profits for a middleman when an overcharge has been
imposed provides an additional rationale for allowing ultimate consumers to sue the violator,
since the middleman in this situation has no incentive to do so.
The exception for a price-fixed good that is a small but vital component of a final product
also has merit because of the likelihood that an overcharge on that component will be passed on
to the ultimate consumer. The relatively small price increase in the final product resulting from
an overcharge on a small, irreplaceable part will have little effect on the demand for the
product; therefore pass-on of the overcharge on the component part would be unlikely to
reduce profits. See id. at 921-25. The difficulty of tracing the overcharge through several
market levels would be reduced if a strong presumption of pass-on were allowed on the basis of
expert testimony, rebuttable by a showing of alternative reasons for the price increase by the
intermediate purchasers.
The exception for middlemen who resell price-fixed goods without altering them has less
merit, though initially it appears that proof of pass-on would be simpler in such a situation. This
distinction has been criticized for focusing on a fact (extent of alteration of the product) that has
no economic significance, and thus no influence over a middleman's ability to pass on an
overcharge. See, e.g., id. at 928-30. Other factors, such as costs and elasticity of demand, that
influence the extent of pass-on might vary widely within this category, and present difficulties
of proof in some situations.
48. 97 S. Ct. at 2074.
49. Id. at 2070 n.16.
50. In In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 198, the contractors who constructed roads for the indirect-purchaser plaintiffs were controlled by their asphalt supplier,
who was charged with a price-fixing violation. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647
(1969), the wholesaler-direct purchaser exerted control over the retailer and the dealer who
bought from it.
51. In response to several inquiries, the Reporter of Decisions' Office first indicated that
the footnote would be changed to read "supplier." However, Justice White then reconsidered
that proposed change. Telephone conversation with Henry C. Lind, Ass't. Reporter of Dcci-
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exception is certain to provoke frequent, time-consuming litigation on the
issue of whether control is present in a given distribution relationship, and if
so, how much is required to bring the case within the exception to the
Illinois Brick holding. 52 The resolution of such issues will require extensive
discovery; indeed, it appears that a motion to dismiss against an indirectpurchaser plaintiff based on Illinois Brick would be premature unless the
plaintiff has been allowed, when it so moved, to proceed with discovery on
the issue of control. When this lengthy process is completed, and if some
elements of control are found to be present, the court must then decide
whether there is enough control to invoke the exception. Thus the trial court
will encounter the very problems of classification that the Illinois Brick
53
Court sought to avoid when it rejected other exceptions to its holding.
Finally, and ironically, the proof of pass-on would not necessarily be any
easier in many of the situations in which some form of control might be
present than it would be in situations in which no such control existed.54
sions (Sept. 23, 1977). See also AtrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Oct. 27, 1977, at A-3.
The footnote reportedly will remain unchanged. Telephone conversation with Reporter of
Decisions' office (Dec. 19, 1977).
52. For example, in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), cited by Justice White, 97 S.
Ct. at 2068 n.7, the supplier controlled its direct customers through "acquisition of stock, or
indirectly through various financial arrangements, including credit." 487 F.2d at 195. Certainly
when a majority of the stock of the direct purchaser is owned by the manufacturer-supplier, use
of pass-on theory must be permitted the indirect purchaser, since manufacturer and purchaser
are virtually the same corporation. Other types of control through stock, however, may not be
as well-defined, such as ownership of a substantial minority of the stock of one corporation by
another, or the "affiliation" situation, in which a corporation with many of the same shareholders as the manufacturer buys out the direct purchaser. Furthermore, a manufacturer who
wished to insulate himself from treble-damage actions might try to take advantage of the Illinois
Brick rule by setting up a distributor that it could control indirectly. Though outright ownership
of a distributor would certainly invoke the control exception, if the distributor were "owned"
by a relative or debtor of the manufacturer's majority shareholder, the control is not as readily
identifiable.
Less direct types of control would include certain franchise arrangements, in which there
may be territorial and supply restrictions. In other situations the manufacturer may establish or
influence the retail price of its product. Finally, credit arrangements, as mentioned by the
Western Liquid Asphalt court, id. at 195, are not uncommon in distribution relationships and
could provide frequent instances in which an indirect purchaser might claim that control was
exerted on a direct purchaser by its supplier.
One decision invoking footnote 16 has already been reported. In re Toilet Seat
Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,601 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 1977). Plaintiff lumber
company bought its toilet seats from defendant manufacturer through a purchasing company.
The court concluded that the purchaser acted as an agent controlled by plaintiff because it
purchased materials, for a fee unrelated to the quantity of goods purchased, at a price approved
by plaintiff. The court held that these indirect-purchaser plaintiffs could assert a pass-on
theory. Id. 61,601, at 72,496-97.
53. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
54. Unless the relationship is one of actual ownership, or unless the manufacturer actually
sets the retail price, see note 52 supra, the difficulty of proving pass-on would still depend
primarily on external market factors. See note 47 supra. Of course, the exception is still
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In response to the majority's concern that proving pass-on would
create new dimensions of" complexity in treble-damage actions, Justice
Brennan pointed out that nearly all antitrust cases necessarily involve "massive evidence and complicated theories." 5 Indeed, initially proving an
overcharge is often just as difficult and complex as is the subsequent burden
of proving it was passed on. 56 Nor does the specter of "massive multiparty
litigations" cited by the majority57 pose so immediate and ominous a threat
to the capability of litigants and courts that indirect purchasers should be
denied any opportunity to prove their injuries and damages. As Brennan
noted, ultimate consumers who are so remote that their damages would be
speculative may be barred from court by application of the liberal, "target
area" test of standing. 58 Moreover, some imprecision in assessing damages
59
has always been tolerated in antitrust cases.
In discussing IllinoisBrick in the context of the punishment purpose of
the statute, the majority opinion focused first on the concern that violators
would be excessively punished: if plaintiffs are allowed to assert pass-on
while defendants are not, both direct and indirect purchasers would be able
to recover the full amount of the overcharge, assuming pass-on could be
proved. 6° Although recognizing that those advocating offensive use of passon would also allow its defensive use when both direct and indirect purchasers attempt to recover in the same lawsuit, 61 and that various procedural
devices could be used to join them in one action, 62 White nevertheless
maintained that there would be no protection against multiple liability when
one claimant had already recovered from the violator by means of a judgment or settlement. 63 He failed to consider alternative methods of dealing
supported by the rationale that since the direct purchaser is unlikely to bring a treble-damage
claim against a supplier that has any amount of control over the purchaser, the indirect
purchaser should be allowed to assert pass-on in those situations.
55. 97 S. Ct. at 2081 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. See also Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The
HanoverShoe Decision, 13 ANTTRusT BULL. 1183, 1210 (1968).
57. 97 S. Ct. at 2072.
58. Id. at 2082 (dissenting opinion). See also note 84 and accompanying text infra.
59. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2067.
61. Id. at 2067 n.ll.
62. The devices most frequently mentioned include transfer for coordinated pretrial
proceedings under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 1976 & Supp.

1977), see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971); interdistrict transfers of
suits effected under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), (b) (1970); and statutory interpleader, id. § 1335.
63. One court has suggested an apportionment scheme to be used in consolidated actions.
The direct purchaser would recover the amount of the overcharge not passed on, and any lost
profits; the ultimate consumers would recover the remainder of the overcharge, if any, and any
other damages proximately caused. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 201; see 97
S. Ct. at 2067 n.11. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that this possibility is largely
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with this situation, such as barring a later suit by plaintiffs who had failed to
intervene in an action by another class of purchasers, or requiring the
plaintiff who wins a judgment or agrees to a settlement to post bond with the
court or pay the settlement into escrow until the statute of limitations has
run, in the event additional claimants should come forward.' The Court's
excessive concern that defendants be protected from a double recovery thus
65
results in the denial of any recovery for many injured parties.

The Court also maintained that assuring a direct purchaser that he can
recover treble the amount of the entire overcharge-if he can prove a
violation-would provide the most effective enforcement mechanism for the
private antitrust action. 66 It is true that the first purchaser, often a large
wholesaler or "middleman," is usually in a better financial position to
litigate than are the generally smaller and scattered ultimate consumers.
Even though such a middleman may have been able to pass on most of an

overcharge and thus may not have an incentive to bring an action on account
of actual injury, 67 he may be sufficiently attracted by the prospect of a full
treble-damage recovery to undertake the considerable burden of antitrust
litigation. Balanced against this tantalizing reward, however, is the danger
the middleman faces of impairing relations with his supplier. Even when the
supplier does not exert actual financial control over the first purchaser, there
theoretical, since "[t]he extended nature of antitrust actions, often involving years of discovery, combines with the short four-year statute of limitations to make it impractical for
potential plaintiffs to sit on their rights until after entry of judgment in the earlier suit." Id. at
2084 (dissent).
64. See McGuire, supra note 8, at 198-200.
65. Justice White expressly rejected the argument that "it is better for the defendant to
pay six-fold or more damages than for an injured party to go uncompensated." 97 S. Ct. at 2067
n. 11. Yet several commentators have noted that treble damages are unlikely to equal a defendant's wrongful profits, largely because the violator has typically enjoyed interest-free use of his
ill-gotten gains for several years before a judgment is rendered against him, and antitrust
plaintiffs are denied prejudgment interest on their recoveries. See, e.g., Schaeffer, supra note
47, at 911-12.
66. 97 S. Ct. at 2070, 2074-75.
67. The majority contended that because the first purchaser operates in an imperfectly
competitive market, he would be forced to absorb some, and "often most" of the overcharge.
Id. at 2073, 2075. Economic theory suggests the contrary, however-that an overcharge would
generally be passed on at least in part, in all types of competitive structures, resulting in higher

retail prices. See e.g., J.

BAIN, PRICE THEORY

141, 145, 198 (2d ed. 1966).

When demand for a product is inelastic, a middleman's profits will be unaffected if he
passes on the overcharge to his customers. Though elasticity of demand will of course vary
throughout the market, price-fixing violations are more likely to occur when an intermediate
purchaser can pass on the overcharge to his customers. In that event the intermediate purchaser would have less incentive to expend his resources in detecting the violation, and the
profit accruing to the price-fixer would be greater when demand is inelastic, since any drop in
the quantity sold as a result of the overcharge would be relatively small. Schaeffer, supra note
47, at 897-900.
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is often a comfortable business relationship between the two, beneficial to a
68
buyer, that he would be reluctant to jeopardize.
In addition, the Court was concerned that requiring apportionment of

any prospective recovery, in the event subsequent purchasers join the
middleman in suing his supplier, would further reduce the latter's incentive
to sue, and thus further impair enforcement. 69 The present uncertainty as to
whether a middleman will sue at all, however, appears to be at least as great
a risk to enforcement prospects--especially since the likely alternative,
under the IllinoisBrick holding, is that no purchaser, direct or indirect, will
bring a suit and the violator will go unpunished. 70 Allowing both direct and
indirect purchasers to attempt to prove their damages would at least encourage enforcement of the antitrust laws by the party who is often the one most
seriously injured by an overcharge, the ultimate consumer, and thus has the
greatest incentive to assert a claim against the violator. Middlemen who
have suffered a substantial loss would still have the lure of a substantial
recovery, and their problems of proof would not be compounded by the
addition as parties to the suit of indirect purchasers, who would have the
burden of proving pass-on before recovering.
The IllinoisBrick opinion indicates that the compensation objective of
the treble damage action was of minimal concern to the Court. Justice White
recognized that the majority's rule denies recovery to indirect purchasers
who may have been actually injured by antitrust violations, 7' but apparently
68. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 198; Wheeler, Antitrust
Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1325, 1330-32 (1973). Some
direct purchasers may actually have benefited from the overcharge. See Schaeffer, supra note
47, at 914.
69. 97 S. Ct. at 2074-75.
70. One commentator asserts that even when pass-on is not explicitly invoked, it is an
implicit factor in the calculation of damages in almost every damage action. Pollock, supra note
56, at 1189. This was borne out in an ironic conclusion to the "Plumbing Fixtures" litigation,
Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), in
which indirect purchasers were barred from asserting pass-on. A subsequent settlement between the manufacturers and some direct purchasers was appealed by the direct purchasers,
who claimed that the district court had not considered their data on overcharges, quantities and
prices. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit conceded that the relevant data had not been
considered, but noted, "[W]e cannot say that such proof would have been too significant
here. . . . [A]mong the numerous factors dictating approval was the fact that the claims of this
class were minimized by the probability that overcharges made upon them were passed on to
their customers." Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1971).
Thus, the defendants not only managed to escape liability altogether to the ultimate purchasers,
but were also liable for merely reduced damages to the direct purchasers on the theory that the
legally injured parties passed on their losses to the same ultimate purchasers. If this is a
representative case with respect to proof of damages in such a situation, a middleman who can
demonstrate no actual damages will be at a substantial disadvantage in settlement negotiations
of a private antitrust suit.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2075.
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felt that this was an unavoidable consequence of emphasizing the efficiency
and deterrence objectives of the Clayton Act. It may be true that, as he
stated, "Hanover Shoe does further the goal of compensation to the extent
that the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of the
overcharge";72 economic reality suggests that that extent will be small
indeed. 73 It is more likely that "[t]he economic burden of most antitrust
violations is borne by the consumers in the form of higher prices for goods
and services." 74 Regardless of which is the better view, it is apparent that
the dissent has accurately interpreted the intent of Congress in giving
priority to the goal of compensating the injured. 75 The recently enacted
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197676 clearly indicates
Congress' intention to emphasize compensation for injured consumers by
authorizing state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae on behalf of the
states' citizens against antitrust violators. 77 Of more direct significance for
Illinois Brick, a new bill has been introduced in both houses of Congress
that would amend the Clayton Act to expressly overrule Illinois Brick and
78
thus provide a remedy for indirect purchasers.
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick elevated the goal of efficiency in
treble-damage litigation, to the resulting detriment of the compensation
objective, in pursuit of a punishment-deterrence approach that is of dubious
merit. Rather than providing for some flexibility in determining which
plaintiffs might have a substantial and deserving claim, the majority formulated a rigid, per se rule that bars virtually all ultimate-consumer plaintiffs from attempting to prove an injury.
72. Id.

73. See note 67 supra.
74. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976), quoted in 97 S. Ct. at 2080 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).

75. This discussion will be limited to Congress' intentions as illustrated in the Antitrust

Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15(b)-(h), 16, 18(a), 26, 1311, 1407 (West Supp.
1977), and in legislation now being considered by Congress. The true intention of the Congress
that passed the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914 with regard to the compensation of injured consumers is less clear. See, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2068, 2069 n.14 (majority); id. at

2079-80 (dissent).
76. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394-96
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15(b)-(h), 16, 18(a), 26, 1311, 1407 (West Supp. 1977)).

77. See, e.g., 97 S.Ct. at 2080, 2081 (dissent). Since the great majority of consumers are
indirect purchasers, the Illinois Brick decision seriously undermines the purpose of this legislation.
78. S. 1874 & H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S 12309 (daily ed. July 15,
1977). This bill is sponsored by Senator Kennedy and Representative Rodino. That the measure
is directed specifically at this decision is obvious by virtue of a provision that it be retroactive to
June 9, 1977-the day the Illinois Brick opinion was handed down. Id. This provision was
included at the suggestion of Senator Hugh Scott, who explained, "The Court deserves to have
its attention respectfully recalled to the will of the Congress." ProposedAmendments to the
Clayton Act: Hearings on S. 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977-1978), quoted in TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH), July 25, 1977, at 2.
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The Illinois Brick holding not only denies compensation to large
groups of parties injured by antitrust violations, it also fails to achieve the
desired efficiency in antitrust litigation. By recognizing an exception to its
holding for situations in which control is exerted over one party in a
distribution relationship,7 9 the Court has created a gap in the Illinois Brick
rule that is potentially as broad as the rule itself. Plaintiffs that would
otherwise be barred at the outset of a treble-damage suit against a manufacturer may be encouraged by the exception to move for discovery and litigate
the control issue, thus consuming much of the court time that was gained by
barring all other indirect purchasers. Moreover, the vague definition of the
exception provides trial courts with great latitude in making the determination of "control" 8 0 and thereby invites inconsistent decisions.
Furthermore, the ruling may have effects on the organization of the
economy that are undesirable in terms of the goals of the antitrust laws.
Manufacturers who engage in price fixing might be encouraged by the
Illinois Brick holding to attempt to insulate themselves from any trebledamage action by setting up a direct purchaser that the manufacturer actually
controls in some indirect manner, hoping to avoid the sweep of the control
exception. Retailers, to preserve their claim in the event of a price-fixing
violation by a manufacturer, might seek to employ a common purchasing
agent, rather than obtaining goods through an independent middleman. To
that extent the Illinois Brick holding, read in light of the control exception,
appears to foster both vertical integration and horizontal collaboration in the
economy.
The difficulties of proof, problems of apportionment and risk of multiple liability that the Court foresaw would indeed present obstacles to the
resolution of treble-damage suits by indirect purchasers. But if compensation of the injured is acknowledged as a priority of the Clayton Act, as the
language of the Act itself suggests,8 1 the Court should have attempted to
resolve these problems in a manner that would entail less drastic repercussions for injured consumers. The risk of multiple liability for defendants is
not great as a practical matter and could generally be prevented through
procedural safeguards. 8 2 In any event, the protection of antitrust violators
should not take precedence over the compensation of those they have
injured. Neither does the difficulty of apportioning damages among different claimants justify barring all except one class of plaintiffs from bringing a
79.
80.
81.
82.

See notes 50-52 and text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
See note 52 supra.
See note 1 supra.
See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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treble-damage action. The task of apportionment could be simplified somewhat if a bifurcated trial system is used; gross liability could be determined
in one trial, and the recovery could be apportioned among plaintiffs in a
second proceeding, in which defendants would not be required to take part.
Moreover, both apportionment problems and difficulties of proof could
be alleviated somewhat by the use of the requirement of standing under
section four to eliminate the most remote plaintiffs. 83 Lower courts, aware
of the need to place some limits on the statute's broad wording, have
employed standing tests in a, generally equitable, pragmatic manner, inquiring whether prospective plaintiffs have been injured to a sufficiently direct,
foreseeable and substantial extent before permitting them to put on their
proof. 84 There will be many treble-damage actions in which the interests of
83. The Illinois Brick Court stated that it would not reach the question of standing, but
noted that "the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for
purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained
injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4." 97 S. Ct. at 2066 n.7.
Assuming the validity of this statement, the Court's determination of "which persons have
been injured," made in the interest of expediency rather than accuracy, nevertheless has the
same effect as denial of standing to a plaintiff, but is more damaging because it does so for the
wrong reasons. Standing concerns the ability to allege injury to an interest protected by the
statute, not to prove such injury. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969);
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148-51 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust
Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74, 680, at 94,978-79 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 594, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
84. Two distinguishable approaches have generally been used by the courts to determine
whether a plaintiff is one injured "by reason of" an antitrust violation. The "direct injury"
approach focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and requires privity
between the two as an element of standing. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir.
1910). The "target area" approach is the more modern and widely followed method today.
Courts employing this approach in effect inquire whether the plaintiff is "within that area of the
economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951). For
a thorough discussion of the two approaches and the cases employing them, see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126-29 (9th Cir. 1973).
The target area approach is the most promising as a tool for eliminating plaintiffs whose
claims would be virtually impossible to prove and would thus needlessly waste the courts' time.
As one district court judge explained, "The target area test is essentially a measure of
remoteness of injury resulting from antitrust violations. In most cases it serves to eliminate
those plaintiffs whose business relationship with defendants is so attenuated as to render the
alleged injury negligible or highly speculative." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
61,360, at 71,268 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1474 (8th Cir. June 20,
1977). For instances in which some variation of the target area test was employed to eliminate
remote plaintiffs, see cases cited in note 29 supra.For circumstances in which the test has been
the basis for finding plaintiffs had standing, see In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974)
(defendant asphalt producers sold asphalt to contractors for use in building highways on
contract to plaintiff); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967) (State
bought corrugated culverts made by defendant from contractors who built highways); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 934 (1966) (milk producers sued wholesale and retail grocers for selling milk from their
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large, multi-level groups of consumers and middlemen will be implicated
and in which the problems of proving pass-on may be insurmountable.
There will, however, be others in which ultimate consumers will be the most
seriously injured parties, will have suffered appreciable damages and will be
well prepared to meet their burden of proof.8 5 An initial standing threshold
would permit such plaintiffs to press their claims, without burdening the

courts with frivolous or unnecessarily complex suits. When the standing
requirement would not bar a class of plaintiffs so large as to be unmanageable, a court could refuse to certify the suit as a class action.8 6 These
procedural bars, though perhaps not as simple to implement as the Illinois
Brick rule, would permit the courts to promote all the objectives fostered by
the treble-damage suit as the circumstances of each case require.
MARTHA JOHNSTON MCDONALD

Civil Rights-Title VII and the Religious Employee:
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison Retrenches
on the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include a
requirement that an employer "reasonably accommodate" his employees'
religious practices or observances unless doing so would cause an "undue
own plant at a loss); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (defendant made zipper sliders and sold them to zipper manufacturers who sold to
plaintiff); Washington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965) (public utility
sued defendant for overchares on 10 eenerators sold it throuh a contractor).
85. One such case, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,360 (D. Minn. Mar.
31, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1474 (8th Cir. June 20, 1977), was recently decided in a
federal district court. A purchaser of a hearing aid brought a class action suit against the
manufacturer for resale price maintenance, alleging that defendants sold hearing aids to selected retail dealers for approximately $100 and set the price to consumers at about $350. Brief for
Appellee at 18. If footnote 16 of Illinois Brick, 97 S. Ct. at 2070 n.16, is interpreted to include
control by a supplier, this case should be one of the exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule. See
notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra. Resale price maintenance, if proved, would surely
be recognized as "control" of a retailer by a manufacturer. If the footnote is read to include
only "customer" control of a direct purchaser, however, the broad language of the decision
might bar the consumer plaintiffs in this case despite their success in establishing their standing
in the district court, simply because they are "indirect purchasers." Because this situation, if
plaintiff can prove her allegations of resale price maintenance, does not require the use of passon theory, it seems particularly unfair to bar the plaintiff under the IllinoisBrick rule, before
any proof may be offered.
86. See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. I1, 1973) (retail
consumers of automobiles had standing to sue for alleged overcharges but proposed class of 30
to 40 million car buyers rejected as unmanageable).
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hardship" on the conduct of the employer's business. 1 The amendment
created continuing confusion about the level to which the employer's accommodation must rise before becoming "unreasonable" and an "undue
hardship. "2 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison3 narrowed the definition of "reasonable" accommodation
by concluding that an accommodation necessitating the circumvention of
seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement or requiring that
the employer bear more than a de minimis cost in complying with the
statute constituted an undue burden. In so holding, the Court followed the
1964 Civil Rights Act requirement of equal treatment of employees 4 and
seemingly ignored the congressional mandate in the 1972 amendments to
the Act requiring reasonable accommodation of employees' religious be5
liefs; that is, inequality of treatment of employees on the basis of religion.
Petitioner Trans World Airlines (TWA) hired Larry Hardison, respondent, as a clerk in its Kansas City, Missouri, Stores Department on June 5,
1967.6 Hardison's position was subject to a collective bargaining agreement
with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM). 7 In 1968, Hardison became a member of the Worldwide Church of
God, a church whose members are required to refrain from work on the
Sabbath (sundown on Friday until sundown on Saturday) and on various
religious holidays. For some time thereafter, Hardison was able to coordinate his religious practices and his work schedule. 8 In December 1968,
1. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975)).

2. See, e.g., Note, Title VII-Religious Discrimination-Employer'sDuty to "Reasonably Accommodate" Employee's Religious Practices-Hardisonv. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 806-10 (1976).
3. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
4. Id. at 2275. The Court pointed out that "[t]he repeated unequivocal emphasis of both

the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well as

minorities." Id. See note 21 infra for the text of the applicable provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. The 1972 amendment, by contrast, is quite simply a provision for special treatment
to some extent. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.

5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975)).

6. The Kansas City TWA base handles maintenance, and its Stores Department operates
24 hours per day, 365 days per year. Whenever an employee is out in this department, a

supervisor or an employee from another section must cover the position because service must
be maintained. 97 S. Ct. at 2268.
7. The agreement provides that seniority applies in the fulfillment of shift and vacation

assignment preferences and in bidding for vacancies, new jobs and transfers. Id. at 2268 n.1.
8. In a memo to a TWA supervisor, the manager of the Stores Department suggested that
the steward try to change Hardison's job or days off, that Hardison have his religious. holidays
off if he agreed to work on more traditional Christian holidays, and that the supervisor should
look for another job for Hardison that would not require Sabbath work. Id. at 2268. Hardison
found his own solution by switching to the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift, which allowed him to observe
the Sabbath.
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however, the situation deteriorated when Hardison transferred to a dayshift
position in another building that had a separate seniority list. Hardison
dropped to second lowest in seniority because of the transfer and was asked
to work on Friday evening and Saturday. 9 Hardison, his supervisor and the
union steward met and discussed several potential solutions to the dilemma,
but none was instituted. 10 Finding no solution forthcoming, Hardison simply
failed to report for work on three consecutive Saturdays. A discharge
hearing was held on March 31, 1969; Hardison was found guilty of insubordination and discharged on April 2, 1969.11 After filing an unlawful employment practice charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and exhausting his administrative remedies, Hardison filed suit against
TWA and IAM alleging religious discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
12
2000e-2.
The district court found that TWA's efforts to resolve Hardison's
conflict fulfilled the requirement of reasonable accommodation and that any
further effort by TWA would work an undue hardship. 13 The Eighth Circuit
9. This situation arose when the lowest person on the seniority list went on vacation in
March 1969. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 36 (8th Cir. 1975).
10. The union refused to waive seniority requirements, and Hardison had insufficient
seniority to bid for another shift or job. TWA was unwilling to allow Hardison to work a fourday week as shifts were already cut to a minimum on weekends. Hardison's presence was
critical because he was the only one available from his shift to perform his function and bringing
in a supervisor or another employee from outside would have understaffed some other area.
Scheduling someone not assigned to the Saturday shift would have required payment of
overtime. 97 S. Ct. at 2268-69.
There was some dispute as to whether someone from another shift was willing to trade
shifts. Id. at 2275, 2281-82. A brief filed by IAM notes that even given such a substitute, the
union would only allow Hardison to switch if his seniority was sufficient to allow it. Brief for
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers at 9. It is unclear whether
either TWA or IAM actually checked to see if there was someone with greater seniority than
Hardison who wanted the potential substitute's job and would therefore have a preeminent
claim to the position.
I1. 97 S. Ct. at 2267. After Hardison was notified that the hearing had been scheduled, but
before it actually occurred, he voluntarily switched to the twilight shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:00
p.m.). IAM was prepared to argue that Hardison should not be discharged as a solution had
been found, but when Hardison left work at sundown on Friday, March 28, it became apparent
that there was as yet no resolution. Id. See also Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 877, 885 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Hardison based his claim on the requirement that employers make "reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees
and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business" found in the EEOC guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1(b) (1976), and on the similar language in the 1972 amendments to Title VII, see note 33
and accompanying text infra.
13. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 887 (W.D. Mo. 1974). The
district court held specifically that IAM was not required to breach the provisions of its
collective bargaining agreement and that TWA was not required to shortchange another area to
replace Hardison or pay premium wages to a replacement. Id. at 891. The court also considered
challenges to the constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation requirement but found that
the provision was not invalid as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Id. at 887-88.
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reversed with respect to TWA and affirmed with respect to IAM, 14 finding
that TWA had discarded three reasonable alternative accommodations and
had proffered none. 15
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in part,' 6 holding in
favor of both TWA and 1AM.' 7 It found no suggested alternative that would
not create an undue burden. The key to the Court's decision was its holding
that reasonable accommodation does not include breaching seniority provisions and violating the seniority rights established therein.1 8 The Court,
however, went on to make it clear that an employer is not required to bear
more than a de ninimis cost in its efforts to accommodate. 19
Hardison dealt primarily with the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. These amendments were the product of a congressional response to administrative and judicial interpretations of the 1964
Act's prohibition against religious discrimination. 20 Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 proscribed employment discrimination based on religion
as an unlawful employment practice, 21 it was, in the minds of its proponents, primarily an attack on racial discrimination. 22 Nevertheless, Congress
14. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1975). The district
court's judgment in favor of IAM was not directly challenged on appeal. Consequently the
favorable judgment was affirmed.
15. The alternatives suggested were permitting Hardison to work a four-day week by
filling in with a supervisor or another worker, filling Hardison's Sabbath shift with other
available personnel within the bounds of the seniority system, or arranging a swap between
Hardison and another employee for the entire shift on the Sabbath alone. Id. at 41. The court
also suggested that if the seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement were too
inflexible to allow such a swap, it would, of itself, constitute an unlawful employment practice.

Id.
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2270. The reversal was a seven to two decision with Justices Marshall and
Brennan dissenting.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2275.
19. Id. at 2277.
20. See text accompanying notes 27-34 infra.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V
1975). The provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
22. Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discriminationand the Role of Arbitration UnderTitle
VII, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599, 599 (1971). The House debates on the statute reveal that the
Judiciary Committee had received little testimony dealing with religious discrimination. Id. at
600 n.10 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 1528-29 (1964)).
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included religious discrimination as a prohibited practice in the tradition of
23
earlier fair employment practices legislation.
In order to ensure the implementation of the goals of Title VII, the
1964 Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 24 The
EEOC, pursuant to its responsibility of assisting employers in complying
with the statute, issued guidelines suggesting that an employer should make
reasonable accommodation to employee religious practices unless such
measures would result in an undue hardship in the conduct of the employer's
business.21 Although the guidelines did not provide a definition of "undue
hardship," it became clear in EEOC rulings made under the guidelines that
only a showing of "compelling circumstances" absolved a non-accom26
modating employer.
In requiring "reasonable accommodation" by employers, the EEOC
postulated a broader realm of discrimination than that envisioned by Congress in its enactment of the Civil Rights Act. 27 The EEOC formulation
suggested that religious discrimination included not only intentional discrimination or inequality of treatment, but also uniform treatment of employees that had a harsher impact on some because of their religious beliefs,
in other words, discrimination by effect. 28 Thus, according to the EEOC
definition, an employer might apply work rules uniformly to all employees
and still be guilty of religious discrimination.
23. Id. at 600. For examples of earlier fair employment legislation, see id. at 600 n.9.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Commission was, in addition to other
responsibilities, to have power "to furnish persons subject to this subchapter such technical

assistance as they may request to further their compliance with this subchapter or an order
issued thereunder" and "to make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the
purposes and policies of this subchapter and to make the results of such studies available to the
public." Id. § 2000e-4(g)(3), (5).
25. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1976).
These guidelines changed the language of a 1966 EEOC statement that excused accommodation

that would result in "serious inconvenience." EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).

26. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 22, at 627. Undue hardship has been found, for
example, when an employee with beliefs requiring that she not work on the Sabbath was hired
for harvesting season and, to accommodate her, the employer would have had to train a
replacement for one day a week. EEOC Dec. 70-99 (1969), [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6061, at

4096. See also Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment-A
Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327, 340 n.81 (1975).
27. 97 S. Ct. at 2275; see note 4 supra.
28. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 22, at 619. Edwards and Kaplan suggest three

possible definitions of "religious discrimination" under Title VII: intentional and wilful acts of
discrimination; discrimination by effect, that is, an employer rule neutral on its face but not
uniform in its impact on employees holding different religious beliefs; and a discrimination by
effect standard that provides for exculpation if the employer has made a reasonable effort to
accommodate the religious needs of the employee or if an accommodation cannot be made
without undue hardship to the employer. Id. The legislative history of Title VII seems to
indicate that Congress intended the intentional discrimination formulation in 1964. Id. at 62022.
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Judicial reaction to the guidelines was mixed; several courts chose to
ignore them altogether and to require a showing of intentional discrimination. For example, in Reid v. Memphis PublishingCo. ,29 the court observed
that, although the 1967 guidelines with their "undue hardship" language
had already been issued, it would not apply them because they exceeded the
congressionally intended scope of Title Vil's bar to religious discrimination. 30 Likewise, in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. ,31 the court refused to
apply the guidelines, speaking even more boldly:
It should be observed that it is regulation 1605.1(b) and not the
statute (§ 2000e-2(a)) that requires an employer to make reasonable
accommodation to the religious needs of its employees. As we have
pointed out, the gravamen of an offense under the statute is only
discrimination. The authority of EEOC to adopt a regulation interof an employer, absent discriminafering with the internal affairs
32
tion, may well be doubted.
In answer to the courts' hostile reception of the EEOC guidelines,
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 adding the following definitional
provision (section 701(j)): "[T]he term 'religion' includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer

demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's
or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue

hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."

33

Congress, by using

the language of the EEOC regulation, gave the force of law to the reasonable
accommodation requirement34and to a discrimination by effect definition of
"religious discrimination. "
29. 521 F.2d 512 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1977).
30. Id. at 518-20.
31. 429 F.2d 324 (1970), aff'd percuriam by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
32. Id. at 331 n.1.
33. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975)). In introducing the amendment from
the floor of the Senate, Senator Randolph expressed his concern about the dwindling membership of certain minority religious sects that had strict tenets regarding observance of the
Sabbath. He further suggested that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been intended to protect
religious conduct as well as belief and is "to protect the same rights in private employment as
the Constitution protects in Federal, State, or local governments." 118 CONG. REC.705 (1972).
With little debate, the provision was passed unanimously on the floor of the Senate. Id. at 73031. Senator Randolph then ordered printed in the record the decisions in Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'dpercuriamby an equally divided Court, 402 U.S.
689 (1971), and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113
(5th Cir. 1972) (employer made no effort to accommodate). The assumption has been that
Congress acted in response to footnote 1 of Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d at 331 n. 1,
quoted at text accompanying note 32 supra. See Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163,
167 (5th Cir. 1976).
34. See note 28 supra.
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Again, judicial response to the obligation placed on employers was
inconsistent. The variation, however, resulted largely from difficulties in
the application of the reasonable accommodation requirement to the unique
facts of each case, 35 rather than from hesitation to accept the discrimination
by effect definition. In response to this confusion among the lower courts
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hardison to delimit the reach of the
reasonable accommodation obligation. 36 But instead of merely providing
guidelines to aid the lower courts in making difficult factual determinations,
the Court rejected the discrimination by effect standard so thoroughly that
the 1972 amendments were left virtually meaningless.
35. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 964 (1976) (employer not required to accommodate Sabbatarian practices when
accommodation would require hiring an additional employee, incurring overtime expenses or
violating seniority expectancies of other workers); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544
(6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) (complaints of
fellow workers of employee not undue hardship). Compare Draper v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975) (offer to transfer employee at a pay reduction is not a
reasonable accommodation when substitution could have been arranged), with Dixon v. Omaha
Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974) (transfer of employee with pay reduction
was a reasonable accommodation when substitution would have necessitated payment of
overtime).
36. Indeed, the Court initially considered whether TWA had made reasonable efforts to
accommodate. Rather than closely examining the district court determination that any further
accommodation would work an undue hardship, 375 F. Supp. at 891, the Court measured the
scope of the efforts TWA had made. Thus, the focus shifted from a determination of what
could have been done to accommodate to what had been done in an unsuccessful effort to do
so. Justice Marshall in the dissenting opinion suggested several alternatives that had not been
raised earlier. 97 S. Ct. at 2281-82. In essence, § 701(j) of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 was reconstructed to require "reasonable efforts at accommodation" rather than
reasonable accommodation. In Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515,51920 (6th Cir. 1975), the court looked for other viable alternatives not pursued, even though the
employer had made reasonable efforts to accommodate. On the other hand, the Court in
Hardison, despite the dissent's protest, 97 S. Ct. at 2281-82, accepted the district court's
finding that TWA had done all that it could do to accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs
without either incurring substantial costs or violating the seniority rights of other employees.
Id. at 2276 n.14.
As an adjunct of its "reasonable efforts" requirement, the Court noted the existence of a
seniority system as a significant accommodation to employee religious needs. Id. at 2264. The
relationship of the seniority system to the accommodation obligation is discussed at text
accompanying notes 37-52 infra. It is significant to note that although seniority systems have
been protected as bona fide under § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even though
discriminatory in impact, see note 44 infra, they had not, prior to the Hardison decision, been
viewed as a specific accommodation of employee religious practices under the terms of the 1972
amendment. The Court's observation on this point raises the question whether an employer's
acquiescence to a seniority provision in a collective bargaining agreement automatically fulfills
its duty of reasonable accommodation. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall rightly noted
that "[tihe accommodation issue by definition arises only when a neutral rule of general
applicability [e.g., routine application of a seniority provision] conflicts with the religious practices of a particular employee." 97 S. Ct. at 2278. It is unlikely that an employer may offer the
mere existence of a seniority system against a charge of unlawful religious discrimination,
despite the Court's broad language, without some additional showing of an effort to accommodate.
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The Court's consideration of the relationship between Hardison's collective bargaining agreement seniority provision and the reasonable accommodation requirement of section 701(j) juxtaposed differing definitions of
discrimination. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act indicated that
37
Congress viewed discrimination as intentional inequality of treatment.
Additionally, in section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act Congress gave
express protection to the bona fide application of a seniority system absent
discriminatory intent in the application. 38 However, section 701(j), enacted

in the 1972 amendments, required reasonable accommodation of employee
religious beliefs, thereby extending the definition of religious "discrimina-

tion" to include the discrimination by effect situation. 39 Arguably, the 1964
Act and section 703(h) did not control such a situation because they were
37. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 22, at 620-22.
38. See note 44 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra. A key problem in recognizing the
discrimination by effect standard in the religious discrimination area is the danger that the
accommodation remedy oversteps the bounds of the establishment clause. Legislation concerning religion must avoid excessive entanglements between government and religion, have a
secular legislative purpose, and have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The arguments for and
against the survival of § 701(j) under these tests are set forth in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,
516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
The majority in Cummins, upholding the statute, found a secular purpose in strengthening Title
VII's prohibition of religious discrimination and in ensuring that employees are not punished for
following the dictates of conscience. Id. at 552. It found the requisite neutral effect in that the
Act primarily ensures job security for people whose religious requirements conflict with
uniform work rules and does not treat one religion differently from another. Id. at 552-53.
The dissent in Cummins suggested that the Act, by protecting only certain religious views
conflicting with job requirements, confounds the secular purpose of Title VII standing alone.
Id. at 556 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent suggested that, by discriminating between the religious and the non-religious and between religious employees whose beliefs
do and do not conflict with work rules, the Act fails the neutral effect test. Id. at 558.
Finally, supporters have noted that the government's only involvement is in determining
whether there has been reasonable accommodation or undue hardship. Id. at 553-54. Critics
suggest that such a determination requires inquiry into the sincerity of employees' religious
beliefs. Id. at 559. See generally Comment, Religious Discriminationin Employment: Striking
the Delicate Balance, 80 DICK. L. REv. 717 (1976).
The Supreme Court has granted exemption from restrictive laws that interfere with the free
exercise of religion. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 409 (1963). Its position has been that "'[n]eutrality' in matters of religion is not
inconsistent with 'benevolence' by way of exemption from onerous duties, so long as an
exemption is tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes." Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (citation omitted).
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Hardison, noted "[i]f the State does not establish religion
over non-religion by excusing religious practitioners from obligations owed the State, I do not
see how the State can be said to establish religion by requiring employers to do the same with
respect to obligations owed the employer." 97 S. Ct. at 2280. When the State grants an
exemption to one of its laws that interferes with the free exercise of religion, it is counterbalancing its invasion of a protected right rather than establishing religion. But when the State
requires an exemption or gives favored treatment based on religion when it has not interfered
with the free exercise of religion, the balance between the free exercise and establishment
clauses has been upset. A citizen has no choice as to whether he will experience the impact of a
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directed at intentional racial discrimination. 4 Consequently, it was unclear
whether section 703(h) protected seniority rights after section 701(j)'s expanded definition of discrimination.
Authority existed for both the intentional inequality of treatment and
the discrimination by effect approaches. The EEOC had adopted the discrimination by effect approach and was exacting in its requirements of
employers with respect to collective bargaining agreements, holding that the
agreement must be capable of modification if necessary to effect reasonable
accommodation. 41 Several courts had determined that if the employer had
any leeway to assign shifts, he must accommodate religious needs, seniority
practices notwithstanding. 4 2 The court of appeals decision in Hardison
seems to have been the high water mark in the trend questioning the
inviolability of seniority provisions in religious discrimination cases, observing that "[i]t would seem that a collective bargaining agreement, the
seniority provisions of which preclude any reasonable accommodation for
religious observances by employees, is prima facie evidence of union and
employer culpability under the Act." 43
On the other hand, the language of section 703(h) requires intentional
discrimination in the application of a seniority system for a violation of the
Act. This requirement seems conclusively to protect the routine application
of a seniority system regardless of its effect. 44 In view of the explicit
law. By contrast, an employee voluntarily chooses his employer, at least theoretically, and
therefore voluntarily assumes the constraints of the employer's work rules.
For critics who view § 701(j) as an establishment clause violation, see Edwards & Kaplan,
note 22 supra; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Establishment Clause-Sixth Circuit Questions
Validity of the Reasonable Accommodation Rule, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 442 (1975); Note, Is
Title VII's ReasonableAccommodations Requirement a Law "RespectingAn Establishment of
Religion"?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 481, 491 (1976). Contra, Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516
F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976);
Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. at 886-87; Note, Civil Rights-Religious
Discrimination in Employment--Title VII Standards of "Reasonable Accomodation" and
"Undue Hardship'"AreConstitutional,But Recent CasesIllustrateJudicialOverzealousness in
Enforcement, 54 TEx. L. REV. 616 (1976).
40. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 22, at 600 n.10.
41. [I]f a collective bargaining agreement is so inflexible as to have the effect of
requiring a party to the agreement to discriminate against an individual because of his
religion and if the inflexibility of the agreement is not justified by substantial business
considerations, then Title VII requires that the agreement be modified so as to
eliminate its discriminatory effect.
EEOC Dec. 73-2066 (1972), [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6367, at 4668 (footnote omitted).
42. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976); Shaffield v.
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 942 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (agreement
had a clause stating that "classificationsenioritycannot be the sole determiningfactorinmaking
shift assignments").
43. 527 F.2d at 41. This observation would seem to be in direct contradiction to § 703(h),
as the Supreme Court decision noted. 97 S. Ct. at 2275.
44. Critics of the Civil Rights Act expressed concern that passage of that Act would
interfere with already established seniority rights of workers in previously segregated work
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intentional discrimination limitation in section 703(h), the Court in Hardison correctly upheld the inviolability of seniority rights in a confrontation
with the accommodation obligation. Congress protected seniority rights
even in the face of its deep concern for the intentional racial discrimination
at Which the Civil Rights Act was primarily directed.4 5 This same protection
undoubtedly would have stood with respect to religious discrimination, a
peripheral concern, if section 703(h) had been considered contemporaneously with the expanded discrimination definition of 701(j).
The Court did not, however, rely exclusively on the explicit language
of section 703(h) requiring intent to discriminate in upholding TWA's
seniority system. It based its decision as well on the broad language of Title
VII emphasizing the elimination of discrimination in employment.4 6 Although "discrimination" as used in the Civil Rights Act is susceptible of
several interpretations, 47 the Court suggested that the only proper definition
areas. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promoting, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1608-09
(1969). In response, two interpretive memoranda were included in the CongressionalRecord
asserting that already established seniority rights would not be affected. The memoranda were
prepared by Senators Clark and Case, 110 CONG. REc. 7212 (1964), and the Justice Department,
id. at 7207; see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 759-60 nn.15 & 16 (1976).
Subsequently, a substitute bill was offered by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen containing the
provision that was later adopted. See id. at 759-61.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system . '. . provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
It has generally been accepted that § 703(h) is an accurate representation of the Clark-Case
memorandum's conclusion that Title VII will not affect vested seniority rights absent discriminatory intent. But see Cooper & Sobol, supra at 1607. The Supreme Court has, since the

passage of § 703(h), held that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system is not an
unlawful employment practice, even when it locks in the effects of past intentional discrimination. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Again, this
provision is directed primarily at the racial discrimination area. It has virtually no application to
the religious discrimination situations because religious "discrimination" in employment is
seldom the result of an intent to discriminate, but rather the product of the clash between an
employer's uniform work rules and an employee's religious practices, resulting in a discriminatory impact.
The remedy suggested in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), is not
available for victims of religious discrimination. In Franks, an award of retroactive seniority
was allowed to victims of post-Act or pre-Act racial discrimination, bringing them up to the
level of seniority they would have achieved absent intentionally discriminatory practices. Id. at
770. In effect, this remedy constitutes a retroactive award of equal treatment. In the case of
religious discrimination, where there has been no past intentional discrimination but present
discrimination by effect, an infringement of others' seniority rights could be, in essence, an
award of unearned superseniority to the accommodated employee.
45. See notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2277.
47. See note 28 supra.
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under the Act is inequality of treatment. 48 In so doing, the Court ignored the
anomaly that while the 1964 Act mandates equality of treatment in employ-

ment, by the Court's interpretation, section 701(j) specifically calls for
special treatment based on religious preferences. The Court did not address
this conflict; instead it read section 701(j) as applying only when it would
result in no inequality of treatment of employees. 49 This approach suggests
that the uniform application of any work rule is an acceptable employment

practice as long as it is not applied with an intent to discriminate, regardless
of its impact on employees with strongly held religious beliefs.50
There is little room for remedying the discrimination by effect situation
under this reading of the statute. Such a situation arises when a work rule of
48. The Court observed that the thrust of the statute is that "similarly situated employees
are not to be treated differently solely because they differ with respect to race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 97 S. Ct. at 2270 (emphasis added). Furthermore, according to the
Court, the Act proscribes discrimination when it is directed against majorities as well as
minorities. Id.
It is arguable that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), conflicts with such an
interpretation. Griggs involved the institution of requirements of a high school diploma or the
passing of an intelligence test as a condition of employment. The Court held that if an

employment practice that operates to exclude Blacks cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, it is prohibited, notwithstanding the employer's lack of discriminatory intent. Id.
at 436. It may be, however, that Griggs is distinguishable from the religious discrimination
situation in that the adoption of such employment prerequisites as diplomas and intelligence
tests perpetuate the effects of past intentional racial discrimination. In addition, if the requirements are not reasonably related to job performance, discriminatory intent may be inferred.
See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 22, at 623-24. Thus, Griggs may be applicable only to
situations involving some history of intentional discrimination.
49. As Justice Marshall's dissent notes, 97 S. Ct. at 2279, the majority's approach is
precisely that taken in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). The court in Dewey stated, "To
accede to Dewey's demands would require Reynolds to discriminateagainst its other employees by requiring them to work on Sundays in the place of Dewey, thereby relieving Dewey of
his contractual obligation. This would constitute unequal administration of the collective
bargaining agreement . . . and lead to grievances and additional arbitration." Id. at 330
(emphasis added).
The result in Dewey was specifically criticized during the introduction of the 1972 amendments, and the text of the case was included in the CongressionalRecord. 118 CONa. REc. 70506 (1972); see note 33 supra. The Court's similar rationale in Hardison, 97 S. Ct. at 2275,
unabashedly contraverts the congressional intent in passing the 1972 amendment.
Additionally, the Court's use of the term "discrimination" against majority employees in
accommodating the religious employee even when the majority employees' contractual rights
are not abridged, id. at 2277, raises the specter of grievances filed by disgruntled employees
whenever an effort is made to accommodate the religious employee. Certainly the existence of
§ 701(j) should exempt an employer from any such danger unless another employee's contractual rights are in fact abridged or his employment situation is in fact worsened as a result of the
accommodation.
50. Justice Marshall strongly disagreed with this interpretation in his dissent. He suggested that the kind of exemption that has traditionally been granted to those with strongly held religious beliefs when governmental obligations conflict with these beliefs should be allowed in
the employment situation. 97 S. Ct. at 2280. Indeed, this seemed to be the legislative intent
underlying the enactment of § 7010). See note 33 supra.

1978]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

general applicability has a harsher impact on an employee with strongly held
religious beliefs. Congress mandated in section 701(j) that an effort be made
to adjust employment conditions for the religious employee to equalize the
impact of such work rules.5 1 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that it is
unacceptable for an employee to be treated differently on the basis of his
religion.5 2 The result is that the "undue burden" test is satisfied by a
demonstration that accommodation would result in unequal treatment of
employees on the basis of their religion.
The logical extension of such a theory is that any accommodation
exclusively for religious beliefs necessitates unequal treatment and constitutes an "undue burden." The Court, however, avoided this extreme, never
stating that no accommodation is required. In concession to the existence of
section 701(j), the Court seems to visualize a realm of accommodation that
is acceptable, indeed required, although technically constituting unequal
treatment on the basis of religion. This unequal treatment does not rise to the
level of "undue hardship." For example, the Court seemed to view favorably the efforts that TWA had made to accommodate Hardison. These
included meeting with Hardison to discuss possible solutions, accommodating Hardison's religious holiday observance (in return for his working
Christian holidays) and authorizing the union steward to search for someone
to swap shifts, a normal procedure. 53 No real costs were incurred, Hardison
received no greater employment advantages than other employees in having
his holidays off because he had to work others, and seeking a swap was a
normal union procedure. Consequently, the threshold at which unequal
treatment constitutes an undue burden was not crossed.
Furthermore, the Court implied that incurring de minimis costs on the
54
basis of religion did not cross the inequality of treatment threshold.
Although no definition of "de minimis" was tendered, the rejection of two
accommodative measures that the court of appeals had found reasonable
somewhat delineated the Court's conception of "de minimis." 55 These
51.

See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.

52. 97 S. Ct. at 2277.
53. Id. at 2273 (quoting 375 F. Supp. at 890-91).

54. Id. at 2277.
55. In concluding that the potential cost of accommodating Hardison would be greater
than de minimis, the Court suggested that TWA might have many employees whose religious
practices prohibit them from working on Sunday. Id. at 2277 n.15. This suggestion seems of
little substance as there is nothing in the record indicating such numbers. Clearly TWA would
have had the burden of producing those statistics had they existed. The opinion, however,
implicitly suggests that if it could be shown that the aggrieved employee was a unique case,
perhaps the cost of replacing him or of paying overtime wages might not be greater than de

minimis. Id. The employer's size may be a consideration in making such a determination.
Nonetheless, this concession must be read in light of the Court's equality of treatment ap-
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alternatives were that Hardison work a four-day week with the uncovered
shift being manned by a supervisor or worker from another department
already on duty or that a replacement be found through the enticement of
overtime wages. 56 Either of these alternatives could have been implemented
without violating the seniority system. Nevertheless, the Court found that
incurring these costs of lost efficiency in other departments and payment of
a substitute's overtime wages reached a level of inequality of treatment that
57
is unreasonable and an undue burden.
In sum, the analysis seems to be that an employer must make an effort
to accommodate, but the manner in which it may do so is severely limited. It
may be required to incur de minimis costs. It should allow voluntary swaps
between employees. It is, however, not required to violate any uniform
work rule so that the religious employee receives greater aggregate benefits
than the other employees on the basis of his religion. The Court evidently
did not consider the time and administrative costs of planning the accommodation as crossing the inequality of treatment threshold in view of its
favorable assessment of TWA's efforts.
After Hardison, several questions remain to confront employers concerning their obligations under section 701(0). Although the Court delineated what is not required, it failed to clarify what an employer is still
obligated to do to comply with the statute. It is clear that an employer cannot
refuse to make any effort on the employee's behalf.5 8 Any negotiated
accommodation that results in no greater employment benefits in the aggregate for the religious employee should be allowed. For example, Hardison
was allowed to have his religious holidays off in return for working on
Christian holidays. This accommodation resulted in no burden to the employer or the other employees that would violate the inequality of treatment
restriction even though it theoretically gave Hardison special treatment on
the basis of his religion. In addition, the employer may be required to incur
some minimal costs, but they should not rise to the level of financing an
additional day off for an employee on the basis of his religion. 59 In sum, an
employer can be required to shoulder only minimal burdens in an effort to
accommodate.
proach. Perhaps the suggestion is that incurring de minimis costs in accommodation does not
rise to the level of inequality of treatment so as to become discrimination. Thus, the definition
of de minimis becomes imperative in determining compliance with the requirement. The Court
offers little guidance on the point.
56. Id. at 2273.

57. Id. at 2277.
58. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975).

59. 97 S. Ct. at 2277.
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A second question remains concerning the extent to which the Hardison decision applies to unions as distinguished from employers. Even
though IAM technically was a prevailing party in the court of appeals, the
Court granted its petition for certiorari because the lower court decision had
assumed that LAM should be required to waive the collective bargaining
agreement to accommodate Hardison. 6° The Court did not, however, explicitly discuss the union's duties, stating merely that "since we reverse the
judgment against TWA, we do not pursue the union's status in the Court."61
This language suggests that the case's holding is as applicable to unions as
to employers. 62 It would seem then that unions are relieved from (or
burdened with) the accommodation duty to the same extent as employers.
Third, the Court premised its protection of vested seniority rights in the
face of the accommodation requirement on two grounds: that section 703(h)
expressly requires intentional discrimination to render the application of a
seniority system an unfair employment practice and that accommodation
would require inequality of treatment of employees. 63 As a result, it is
unclear whether this protection is extended to other terms of collective
bargaining agreements absent the specific statutory language of section
703(h) that is directed only to seniority provisions. As the Court employed
its equality of treatment approach in considering other alternative accommodations not regulated by an agreement, the indication is that any term
included in a collective bargaining agreement is protected from the reasonable accommodation requirement so long as inequality of treatment
64
would result from the accommodation.
Hardison leaves impotent the congressional mandate in section 701(j)
that an employer reasonably accommodate employee religious practices.
The amendment's significance, apart from the 1964 Act's general prohibition of discrimination, was the recognition of the discrimination by effect
situation when a uniform work rule has a greater, impact on employees with
certain strongly held religious beliefs. 65 The Court, ignoring this evident
variation in the definition of discrimination, returned without extensive
60. Id. at 2270 n.5.
61. Id.
62. This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that other provisions of Title VII have
been held to apply to unions. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d at 42.
63. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.

64. An example of such a provision is the agency shop clause, found in many collective
bargaining agreements, requiring each employee to contribute to the union. These provisions
have been held to conflict with strictly held religious views barring support of labor unions. See,

e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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comment to the pre-1972 amendments stance of the Civil Rights Act
requiring equality of treatment. Thus, an employer no longer has to make a
showing of undue hardship; it need only show that accommodation will
require greater than de ninimis costs or "unequal" treatment of employees.
In so circumscribing the requirement, the Court nearly proclaims the amendment a nullity.
ELIZABETH L. MOORE

Commercial Law-Anticipatory Repudiation: A New Measure
of Buyers' Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code
Measuring an aggrieved buyer's damages when a seller wrongfully
repudiates a contract before performance is due has long been considered a
troubling and complex task. I The complexity concerns, first, the time from
which damages should be measured if the buyer chooses not to purchase
substitute goods (cover) and, second, the application of the Uniform Commercial Code's concept of cover in determining this time. 2 Section 2-713 of
the Code, which sets forth the buyer's damages for nondelivery, states that
damages should be measured by calculating the difference between contract
3
price and market price at the time the buyer "learned of the breach. "
Section 2-610, however, indicates that if a seller repudiates before performance is due, an aggrieved buyer may await performance for a "commercially reasonable time" before taking any action. 4 Damages can be calculated
1. See, e.g., R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 149 (1970); J. WHITE &

R.

SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

6-4 (1972).

2. U.C.C. § 2-712 provides:
"Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods
(I) After a breach within the preceeding section the buyer may "cover" by
making in good faith and -without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or
contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between
the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential
damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from
any other remedy.
3. U.C.C. § 2-713 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is
the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller's breach.
4. U.C.C. § 2-610 provides in pertinent part: "When either party repudiates the contract
with respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may (a) for a commercially reasonable time await
performance by the repudiating party .... "

1978]

ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION

with little difficulty if the buyer does cover.5 The buyer who does not cover,
however, is subjected to great uncertainty in damage measurement because
of the clash between the "learned of the breach" language of section 2-713
and the "commercially reasonable time" policy of section 2-610. The buyer
does not know if his damages will be measured in relation to market price at
the time he became aware of the seller's intent not to perform, or if he can
await performance and have damages measured by the market price at some
later date. The puzzle is made even more complex by the difference in
"learned of the breach" in section 2-713 and the use in section 2-723,
which details the measure of damages in anticipatory repudiation cases
coming to trial before time of performance, of the time the buyer "learned
6
of the repudiation."
In the recent case of Cargill,Inc. v. Stafford,7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit offered a new solution to the puzzle by
holding that under section 2-713 a buyer may encourage the seller's performance for a reasonable time, but that at the end of that reasonable period
he should cover if substitute goods are readily available. The court stated
that if the buyer can readily cover and does not do so within a reasonable
time, damages should be based on the market price of the goods at the end of
the reasonable time rather than on the price when performance is due. s If,
however, the buyer has a valid reason for not covering, damages should be
9
calculated from the time when performance is due.
The court's opportunity to address the problem presented itself in a
case involving contracts for the sale of wheat. Cargill, the aggrieved buyer, 10 made two July telephone contracts with defendant-seller Stafford. On
August 24, plaintiff received written notice that defendant, objecting to
some provisions of the confirmations that plaintiff had mailed to him,
considered the contracts void and refused to perform. 1 Plaintiff continued
5. See note 2 supra.
6. U.C.C. § 2-723 provides in part:
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time
for performance with respect to some or all of the goods, any damages based on
market price (Section 2-708 and 2-713) shall be determined according to the price of
such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learnedof the repudiation.

Id. (emphasis added); see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455-56; J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-7, at 197-202.
7. 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
8. Id. at 1227. The seller will be most likely to repudiate in a rising market; therefore, the
buyer's damages measured at this time will ordinarily result in lesser damages than those

measured at a later time.
9. Id. Colorado law governed the case; Colorado has adopted without change the

sections of the U.C.C. considered in the Cargill decision. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 4-2-610,
-708, -713, -723 (1973).

10. Plaintiff is a cash merchandiser in agricultural commodities. 553 F.2d at 1223.
11. Id. at 1226.
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to urge defendant to complete performance of the contract until there was a
final rebuff from defendant on September 6. Plaintiff then notified defendant that the contracts were cancelled. 12
In his suit for breach of contract, 13 plaintiff claimed that its damages
should be measured either by the difference between the contract price and
the market price on August 24, the date plaintiff received notice of defendant's definite repudiation of the contracts, or by the difference between the
contract price and the market price on September 30, the date performance
of the contract was due.1 4 The district court measured the damages using
September 6, the date of Stafford's final rebuff, as the date for determining
the market-contract price differential.15 The court of appeals, stating that the
16
district court "gave no reason for its selection of the September 6 date,"'
remanded the case to determine the correct date for measuring damages. In
doing so, the Tenth Circuit indicated that September 6 would be the correct
date only if Cargill did not have a valid reason for his failure or refusal to
cover, 7 but that September 30, the date performance was due, would be the
date from which to measure damages if Cargill had a valid reason for not
covering. 18
The court effectively interpreted the "learned of the breach" language
of section 2-71319 to mean the "time performance is due" since a buyer
would normally have a valid reason for not covering. 20 The court looked to
12. Id. at 1224.

13. Defendant had asserted that neither of the two contracts was enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds because he had made timely objection to the written confirmation sent to him
by the buyer. Id. at 1225. COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-201(2) (1973) states:

Between merchants, if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirement of subsection (1)of this
section against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received.
Stafford's statutorily required written objection to the second contract, however, did not reach
Cargill within the required 10 day period. 553 F.2d at 1225.
14. 553 F.2d at 1223.

15. Id.at 1225.
16. Id.

17. The court noted, "The record does not show that Cargill covered or attempted to
cover. Nothing in the record shows the continued availability or nonavailability of substitute
wheat." Id. at 1227.
18. Id.
19. See note 3 supra.

20. Courts have considered the validity of reasons for not covering when deciding
whether a buyer should be awarded consequential damages under U.C.C. § 2-715, quoted in
note 39 infra. These cases provide some examples of potentially valid excuses for not covering

in determining when to measure damages under the Cargill test. See, e.g., Lake Village

Implement Co. v. Cox, 252 Ark. 224, 478 S.W.2d 36 (1972) (failure to cover by procuring
substitute equipment excused when equipment for harvest not readily available and crop ready
for harvest); Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d
209, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1971) (plaintiff unable to cover because substitute items unavailable at
prices within his financial ability).
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the use of "repudiation" in section 2-72321 and reasoned that if the drafters

of the Code had intended "learned of the breach" in section 2-713 to mean
"learned of the repudiation," the word "repudiation" would have been
used. 22 The court also relied heavily on the common law tradition interpreting "learned of the breach" to mean "time performance is due.' '23 The
court's emphasis on cover does not, however, arise from any common law
tradition, but is instead an extension of the Code provisions concerning the
subject.
At common law, damages traditionally were measured by calculating
the difference between contract price and market price at the time performance was due. 24 Section 67(3) of the Uniform Sales Act, which codified the
common law approach, adopted this same measure?25 According to the
Restatement of Contracts, "[T]he rules for determining the damages recoverable for an anticipatory breach are the same as in the case of a breach at the
26
time fixed for performance."

Cargillfollows this pre-Code tradition in its determination that in cases
of anticipatory repudiation by the seller the buyer's damages are to be
measured by the contract-market price differential at the time performance
was due. This formulation represents a definite break from other post-Code
cases interpreting section 2-713, which generally have presumed that the
buyer learned of the breach when he learned of the seller's repudiation.27
21. See note 6 supra.
22. 553 F.2d at 1226.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see, e.g., MeJunkin Corp. v. North Carolina Natural Gas Corp., 300 F.2d 794, 801
(4th Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 300 F.2d 794 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962)
(damages measured from the time performance due); Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195
F.2d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1952) (reversing district court measurement of damages from the time of
repudiation in an anticipatory repudiation case); Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co.,
102 F. Supp. 354, 363 (E.D. Ark. 1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1952) (damages are
measured when performance is due; an aggrieved buyer "is not required to go upon the open
market and purchase upon receipt of notice that the seller does not intend to perform");
Comment, A Suggested Revision of the ContractDoctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 64
YALE L.J. 85, 92 n.40, 95 n.54 (1954).
25. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 67(3) states:
Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of
damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a
greater amount, is the difference between the contract price and the market or current
price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if
no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver.
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 338 (1932).

27. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977); Maxwell v.
Norwood Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
Many commentators have ignored or failed to recognize the inconsistencies inherent in § 2713. See, e.g., Hey, Remedies for Breach of Sales Contract Underthe Code, 7 WASHBURN L.J.
35 (1957); Small, The Remedy Provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Practical Orientation, 4 GONZ. L. REv. 176 (1969).
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Damages then were measured by calculating the difference between the
28
contract price and the market price at the time of the seller's repudiation.
There is no suggestion in those cases that a damage calculation should be
based on the time performance was due.
In its interpretation, the Cargillcourt depended chiefly upon White and
Summers, 29 who strongly urge that "learned of the breach" in section 2-713
means "time performance is due" and conclude that the Code should not be
interpreted in a manner that changes pre-Code law without a more definite
statement that clearly indicates the change. 30 Cargill'sutilization of the time
performance was due as the time from which to measure damages was
conditioned upon a finding that the aggrieved buyer had a valid reason for
failing or refusing to cover. 31 Here the common law provided little guidance. Pre-Code decisions did not require or even encourage an aggrieved
buyer to purchase substitute goods. If he chose, a buyer could cover and
ordinarily recover the difference between the contract price and the substitute price if he used reasonable care in making his substitution. 32 If,
however, the price the buyer paid for cover exceeded the court's determination of the market price at the time performance was due, the buyer had to
33
absorb the additional loss.
The Code statutorily recognizes and places new emphasis upon the
concept of cover. Karl Llewellyn, chief reporter for the Code, 34 wanted to
require cover whenever possible.3 5 The Code itself, however, although
28. In a case relied upon in Cargill, Oloffson v. Coomer, II Ill.
App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d

871 (1973), cited at 553 F.2d at 1226, however, the court considered times other than repudiation for the purpose of measuring damages. Although the Coomer court calculated damages

based on the time of repudiation, id. at 921, 296 N.E.2d at 873, it also took into account the
commercially reasonable time requirement of § 2-610 in its decision that in this case damages
measured from the time of repudiation also met the commercially reasonable time requirement.
The Coomer court reasoned that because the spller's statement was an unequivocal repudiation
and cover was easily obtained, it would have been unreasonable for the buyer to await

performance. Id. at 922, 296 N.E.2d at 874. Cargillis consistent with Coomer in this respect,
but goes beyond Coomer by suggesting a time from which to measure damages if the buyer has
a valid excuse for not covering. 553 F.2d at 1227.

29. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1,§ 6-7, at 198-202.
30. Id. § 6-7, at 201-02.
31. 553 F.2d-at 1227.
32. See, e.g., Hosiery Co. v. Cotton Mills, 140 N.C. 452, 53 S.E. 140 (1906).

33. See, e.g., Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881).
34. The history of the Code is described in Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation
and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967). Llewellyn
wrote of the "democratic process" that produced the Code "over a period of more than fifteen

years, out of the labors of more than fifteen hundred skillful lawyers" in Llewellyn, Why We
Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 374 (1957).
35. Llewellyn set forth his reasoning in REVISED UNIFORM SALES Acr § 58-A, Comment
(Second Draft, 1941):

If there should be real desire to give effect to the principle frequently announced by
the Courts, that "one party to a contract will not be allowed to speculate upon the
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clearly favoring cover, does not expressly require that a buyer make a
substitute purchase. Furthermore, none of the Code's scattered references
and comments related to cover indicate that, in cases of anticipatory repudiation, the time from which damages are measured should be determined by
reference to whether a buyer could have covered. Section 2-711, a catalogue
of buyers' remedies, states that the buyer may cover or recover damages
under 2-713.36 Section 2-712, the primary Code provision concerning cover, states that a buyer "may" cover; the official comment to this section
stresses that "the buyer is always free to choose between cover and damages
for non-delivery." 37 The final comment to section 2-713 states, "[T]he
present section provides a remedy which is completely alternativeto cover
....
"38 The only indication in the Code that the buyer might suffer if he
does not cover is section 2-715(2)'s assertion that consequential damages
39
might be limited by a party's failure to cover.
Although the Code does not expressly require cover, the combination
and effects of available remedies may make the procurement of cover a
practical necessity for the buyer, particularly if the buyer's damages are to
be measured at the time of repudiation. Use of this time to measure damages
gives the repudiating seller a commanding position because he can choose
the time of repudiation and therefore dictate the time at which damages will
be measured. n0 Typically, the buyer will cover and damages will be measother," the measure for the purpose would be a provision, in regard at least to
anticipatory breach, whereby the party in breach could require the aggrieved party, by

demand, to resort to cover or cancel without liability, within a reasonable time after
such demand. Inability to effect cover after reasonable effort would of course not in
any manner impair the common remedies of the aggrieved party.
36. U.C.C. § 2-711 provides in part:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and

with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the
buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so
much of the price as has been paid

(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods
affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or

(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-713).
37. Id. § 2-712, Comment 3.
38. Id. § 2-713, Comment 5 (emphasis added).

39. Id. § 2-715(2) provides in part: "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which

the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise ....

"

40. See, e.g., Anderson, Repudiation of a ContractUnderthe Uniform Commercial Code,
14 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1964); Squillante, Sales Law in Iowa Under the Uniform Commercial
Code-Article 2, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1970). Anderson's article, which presumes that the

buyer's damages are to be measured at the time of repudiation, is the strongest statement of this
position:
The new formula diminishes the value of [the buyer's] action for damages: he recovers

the amount that the market price has increased between the date of the contract and
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ured under section 2-712.41 The buyer, however, cannot be certain how his
damages will be measured if he does not cover. 2 There is very little case
law in this area upon which the buyer can rely.43 There is not even
agreement about whether cover must be used as a measure of damages if it is
obtained, or whether the buyer procuring cover retains an option to bring
suit for damages.' Furthermore, commentators on the Code disagree about
45
the propriety of a requirement of cover.
Cargillclearly places cover in a critical position. In Cargill, the entire
measure of damages hinges on whether a contract for substitute goods could
have been made. Under the test suggested by the court, measurement of
damages will vary widely, depending upon the acceptability of the buyer's
excuse for not procuring cover. 46 If the buyer has no acceptable excuse, his
damages are measured by the difference between the contract price and the
market price at the end of a "reasonable time." 47 If measured at this time,
the date of the repudiation, and an alert seller can make that difference small or
nothing by repudiating immediately after a price rise appears to be likely. This
deterioration to the point of worthlessness in the buyer's action for damages practically compels him to resort to the remedy of "cover."
Anderson, supra at 18-19.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. One commentator blames these uncertainties on the general attitude of the Code
draftsmen towards damages, pointing out that the Code makes every effort to protect reasonable investments actually made in the market, but that "the Code shifts about, erratically
and unpredictably, when damages are to be measured by a market to which the complainant has
had no recourse. It is almost as if the draftsmen felt that such a remedy was in any case so
undeserving that its precise statement became unimportant." Peters, Remedies for Breach of
ContractsRelating to the Sale of Goods Underthe Uniform CommercialCode: A Roadmap for
Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 267 (1963).
43. Oloffson v. Coomer, 1111. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973), discussed in note 28
supra, is the only case (other than Cargill)that discusses at length an interpretation of § 2-713 in
connection with anticipatory repudiation when the buyer does not cover. Other cases determining when damages should be measured under § 2-713 generally choose the time of the seller's
repudiation without any detailed discussion. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d
967, 971 (4th Cir. 1977) (date of seller's repudiation presumed to be correct date for damage
measurement); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 800 (5th Cir. 1973)
(comparison of § 2-713 with pre-Code Texas law stating damages measured at time and place of
breach); Maxwell v. Norwood Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829,831 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (damages refused to buyer because of no evidence on exact date he learned of seller's
repudiation); Sawyer Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Linke, 231 N.W.2d 791,795 (N.D. 1975) (acceptance of repudiation not necessary to effectuate breach); Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546
S.W.2d 346, 356 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (buyer learned of the breach when seller repudiated).
44. See Maxwell v. Norwood Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
45. Compare 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1.4403, at 249 (1964) and R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1,§ 145, at 445 n.88 (Code does not
require cover) with J.WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-4, at 191 n.77 (practical necessity

for cover under the Code).
46. 553 F.2d at 1227. The court does not discuss what an acceptable excuse would be.
Earlier cases indicate that a wide variety of reasons are acceptable. See note 20 supra.
47. 553 F.2d at 1227. This presumably corresponds with § 2-610's "commercially reasonable time." See note 4 supra.
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the damages would be likely to correspond closely with the damages
assessed in cases in which the buyer does cover, because substitute goods
must be procured within a commercially reasonable time. The buyer with an
acceptable excuse for not covering would measure his damages in relation to
the market price when performance was due. Any correspondence between
this measure of damages and damages in cases in which the buyer does
cover would be fortuitous.
The interpretation chosen by the Cargillcourt is not, however, the only
alternative interpretation of section 2-713's language and the concept of
cover. Nordstrom stresses a reconciliation of the Code sections concerning
anticipatory repudiation and concludes that the aggrieved buyer's damages
in such cases should be measured at a reasonable time after the repudiation.4" This reasonable time, which takes section 2-610 into account, 49
would be such time after the repudiation as would allow the buyer to
contract for substitute goods.5" In a period of fluctuating market value, the
buyer would not be at the mercy of a seller who could choose the time of
repudiation. Nor would the buyer be able to speculate at the seller's expense
by determining whether he could more profitably cover or collect damages,
51
since the two figures would correspond closely.
The choice between the various analyses of section 2-713 would be
difficult even if only historical considerations and the "commercially reasonable time" requirement of section 2-610 were weighed in the balance.
The language of section 2-723(1), however, requires that the time of the
seller's repudiation be used to calculate damages in cases of anticipatory
repudiation that come to trial before the time of performance. 52 This requirement provides a simple method for determining what the market price would
be at the time of performance-a time that, in the situation addressed by
section 2-723, would not yet have arrived. If one interprets "learned of the
breach" in section 2-713 to mean the time of "repudiation" as used in
section 2-723, however, the aggrieved buyer is foreclosed from awaiting the
seller's performance for a "commercially reasonable time," a privilege the
buyer has under section 2-610. Therefore, an analysis equating "learned of
48. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1,§ 149, at 455.

49. See note 4 supra.
50. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455. White and Summers reject this explanation as doing more violence to the language of § 2-713 than their conclusion. J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-7, at 201 n.108; see Leibson, Anticipatory Repudiationand Buyer's
Damages-A Look Into How the U.C.C. Has Changed the Common Law, 7 UNIFORM COM.
CODE L.J. 272 (1975).
51. See note 55 infra.
52. See note 6 supra.
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the breach" with "time of repudiation" in section 2-723 merely shifts the
53
focus of the inconsistencies.
The Code's internal inconsistencies, 54 the lack of a strong interpretive
trend in court decisions, and disagreement among major Code commentators all make it difficult to determine a buyer's damages in cases of
anticipatory repudiation. The strength of the Cargill court's conclusion
depends upon the interpretation of the purpose of section 2-713. If the
section is Viewed as blending with and supporting the other sections of the

Code concerning anticipatory repudiation, the "time the buyer learned of
the breach" should correspond closely with the time required for procuring
cover. 55 If, however, the relationship between section 2-713 and the other
Code sections is not considered paramount, the pre-Code formula equating
"time the buyer learned of the breach" with "time performance is due" is

more logical. 56 The Tenth Circuit believed that the section was not meant to
change the common law and its statutory statement in section 67(3) of the
Uniform Sales Act 57 and accordingly tied its conclusion to pre-Code considerations, 58 rejecting the rather weak trend of post-Code cases of deter53. The Cargillcourt believed that the use of "repudiation" in § 2-723 and "learned of the
breach" in § 2-713 indicated that the two expressions referred to two different times. 553 F.2d
at 1226. Most commentators, however, begin with the presumption that the "breach" of § 2-713
refers to the same time as the "repudiation" of § 2-723 and then try to reconcile the two. See R.
NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455 (since § 2-723 measures damages from time of
repudiation when case comes to trial before performance is due, "time of performance" would
be used when the case comes to trial after performance is due); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 1, § 6-7, at 199 (cautions against overstressing the importance of § 2-723); Peters, supra
note 42, at 265 (§ 2-723 relates only to evidentiary difficulties); Comment, supra note 24, at 104
(poses interpretation of § 2-723 that would make the section repugnant to basing damages for
anticipatory repudiation on a time other than when performance is due). Section 2-610 must
weigh more heavily in the balance, however, in interpreting § 2-713 than does § 2-723. R,
NORDSTROM, supra § 149, at 455; Liebson, supra note 50, at 281; Comment, supra at 104.
54. The harshest indictment of the inconsistency of Code language is found in Mellinkoff,
The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185 (1967). This article,
however, does not specifically address § 2-713 problems.
55. Presumably the damages figures would closely correspond because the calculations of
the contract-market price differential would use approximately the same time period in measuring damages. Thus, if the buyer covers (something he must do without unreasonable delay), the
cover price will be used in determining damages. If, however, the buyer does not cover, the
price at the time he should have covered (at the end of a reasonable time after learning of
repudiation) will be used.
56. If Code considerations were put aside, the reasons for following common law tradition
would be even stronger as both a desire for consistency in measurement and the strength of the
long tradition would point towards continuing the common law interpretation.
57. 'See note 25 supra.
58. Various authorities have put forth theories about the purpose of § 2-713 that offer a
wide range of interpretive possibilities. Peters suggests in her article that it could be interpreted
as a statutory liquidated damages clause. Peters, supra note 42, at 259. One commentator
suggests that § 2-713 was not intended by the draftsmen to apply to situations of anticipatory
breach, but "was drafted to meet those instances where the buyer does not learn of the breach
until after the date of performance." Comment, supra note 24, at 103. White and Summers
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mining anticipatory repudiation damages in relation to the contract-market
59
differences at the time of the seller's repudiation.
The Cargill decision accomplishes two things. At the very least, it
analyzes carefully the phrase "learned of the breach" as it relates to the
concept of cover. This fact in itself would separate the case from other
decisions that ordinarily presume that "learned of the breach" means time
of repudiation. 60 The decision should also clearly illustrate to the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code 61 that the problems long
discussed by Code commentators are now resulting in widely divergent
judicial opinions. 62 The Code itself was drafted in order to establish simplicity, clarity and uniformity of law. 63 These goals are not being realized in
those cases when sellers repudiate before time of performance has arrived
and the buyer does not cover. Cargill is an attempt at clarification, but no
court can reconcile the language of section 2-713 and the sections that
specifically discuss anticipatory repudiation until the purpose of section 2713 is further explained.
The Cargill decision adds to the uncertainty by making an acceptable
excuse for not covering the determinant in setting the time from which to
measure damages.64 The buyer must be concerned not only with when his
damages will be measured under the Cargill formula, but also with what
will be considered a valid reason for not covering. The only reasonable
escape for the buyer from this maze of uncertainties is to cover and have
damages measured according to section 2-712.65 For the buyer who does not
agree with this theory, adding that perhaps it is to induce the buyer to cover. J. WHITE & R.

SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-7, at 199, 205. Nordstrom is less kind to the draftsmen, stating that
"it looks as if the problem of measuring damages following a repudiation was either not
considered by the drafters or was considered on different occasions and resolved differently

each time it was considered." R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455-56.
59. 553 F.2d at 1226.

60. Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977); Maxwell v. Norwood
Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
61. 1961 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTIETH YEAR

166 indicates the board is to consider proposed amendments when "(a) It has been shown by

experience under the Code that a particular provision is unworkable or for any other reason
obviously requires amendment; or (b) Court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation
of a provision of the Code doubtful and an amendment can clear up the doubt .... "

62. Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977), which calculated
damages in an anticipatory breach case from the date of repudiation, was decided only a few
months before Cargill.It represents the opposite extreme (from time performance was due) in
setting the time for measuring damages.
63. See U.C.C. § 1-102.
64. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
65. The buyer, of course, could escape the maze by circumventing it completely. Detailed
drafting of the contract could include a provision stating when the market price is to be
determined in a situation of anticipatory breach by the seller in which the buyer does not cover.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) provides that the provisions of the Code may be "varied by agreement."
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cover, however, a more faithful interpretation of the language of the Code
would keep cover as a choice, not as an integral determinant of damage
measurement.
Pre-Code law favored a method for calculating damages that could be
applied in all cases. 66 Perhaps this policy of uniformity should also help
determine the direction of post-Code decisions. At interpretation of section
2-713's "learned of the breach" to mean that an aggrieved buyer who does
not cover would also "learn" of the breach at the end of the same time
period he would have had to procure cover would serve a dual purpose. It
would reconcile section 2-713 with the basic policy of allowing a buyer a
"commercially reasonable time" before taking any action and, in contrast
to Cargill, would be more likely to yield the same amount in damages as
when the buyer covered. In this way, the courts would be upholding an
important traditional purpose of damage measurements while resting their
decisions on Code considerations and policies.
CARLYN GRAU POOLE

Criminal Law-Polygraph Examination Results Admissible in
Post-Conviction Hearings
Despite the widespread use of and reliance upon the polygraph or "lie
detector"' in nonjudicial and pretrial investigations, 2 courts have regarded
the polygraph with suspicion. Polygraph examination results have been
barred from most courts in the United States 3 on the ground that such
66. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
1. The polygraph, commonly called a "lie detector," is designed to monitor and measure
certain physiological responses of a person who is answering a set of "yes" or "no" questions.
The device consists of three basic parts: (1) a "pneumograph tube" which is fastened around
the subject's chest to record respiration; (2) a blood pressure cuff to record pulse and blood
pressure; and (3) electrodes fastened to the hands or fingers through which an imperceptible
electric current passes in order to record galvanic skin response. The instrument produces an
electromechanical recording of unconscious physiological changes theoretically produced by
internal stress caused by an examinee's conscious insincerity. The polygraph examiner's expert

opinion regarding his examinee's sincerity is based on his analysis of the recording and other
circumstances of the examination. See generally 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 999 (J.Chadbourn rev. 1970 & Supps. 1975 & 1977).
2. See, e.g., People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 313, 235 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (1975)

(Michigan Supreme Court took judicial notice of investigative usefulness of polygraph).
3. E.g., Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929
(1959); People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959). But see United States v.
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evidence has not gained "general scientific acceptance," 4 the traditional
test for admission of such evidence originally set forth in Frye v. United
States.' Michigan has joined the majority of jurisdictions in barring polygraph evidence from use at trial. 6 In a case of first impression, however, the
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Barbara7 held that, in ruling on a
post-conviction motion for a new trial, the judge may in his or her discretion
weigh the results of a polygraph examination. 8
Movant Joseph Barbara, Jr., was accused of having extorted money
from Delores Lazaros by threatening the lives of her son and imprisoned
husband. 9 In fear of movant's threats, Lazaros informed no one of the
incident until her husband, Peter Lazaros, returned from prison.' 1 The
at the trial
authorities were informed at that time and, following testimony
11
convicted.
was
Barbara
Lazaros,
Delores
and
Peter
by both
Following a number of unsuccessful appeals, 12 Barbara moved for a
new trial, asserting that newly discovered evidence showed that Peter
Lazaros had given perjured testimony.13 Movant offered two new witnesses
and testimony regarding the results of polygraph examinations passed by
one of the two new witnesses;' 4 although the trial court barred the polygraph
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (rejected nonadmissibility); Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421,313 N.E.2d 120 (1974) (special exception made when defendant
agrees in advance to take a polygraph test and submit the tests irrespective of results).
4. See text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
6. As recently as 1968, the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Frechette, 380 Mich.
64, 155 N.W.2d 830 (1968), reaffirmed its opposition to the use of polygraph evidence at trial,
stating, "There can be no doubt at present that in this jurisdiction the results of lie detector tests

are inadmissible." Id. at 68, 155 N.W.2d at 832.
7. 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977).
8. Id. at

-,

255 N.W.2d at 197-98.

9. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 173.
10. Delores Lazaros alleged that while her husband was imprisoned, movant came to her
home, raped her and extorted money from her. Id.
11. Id.
12. Barbara's initial appeal asserted that the behavior of witnesses Peter and Delores
Lazaros in injecting extraneous and prejudicial matters into their testimony in the presence of
the jury deprived movant of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The Michigan Court of
Appeals rejected Barbara's claim on appeal, 23 Mich. App. 540, 179 N.W.2d 105 (1970), and the
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, 383 Mich. 803 (1970). The United States
District Court granted movant's writ of habeas corpus, see 400 Mich. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 173,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Barbara v. Johnson, 449 F.2d
1235 (6th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972).
13. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 173.
14. One of Barbara's new witnesses, a cousin of Peter Lazaros, testified that Lazaros told
him his wife was not raped and that Lazaros admitted making up the story to get out of prison.
The witness had successfully taken a polygraph examination. He came forward with his
testimony after he learned that movant had been sentenced to a long prison term. Id. at-, 255
N.W.2d at 173-74.:
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evidence it "permitted a special record of the tests to be made.' 5 Barbara's
motion for a new trial was denied' 6 on the grounds that Michigan law

prevented the admission into evidence of polygraph examination results in a
post-conviction proceeding and that the testimony did not constitute newly
7
discovered evidence sufficient to warrant a new trial.1
On appeal 18 the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that
polygraph evidence is inadmissible at trial, 19 but rejected the trial judge's

assumption that he had no discretion to consider the polygraph evidence in a
post-conviction motion for a new trial, even if he was satisfied with the
reliability of the polygraph machine and the proficiency of the polygraph
operator.2" The court reasoned that such discretion was permissible because
21
a motion for a new trial requires lesser standards of proof than a trial itself.
15. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 174.
16. The hearing judge conceded that Peter Lazaros' cousin's testimony discredited the
testimony of Peter Lazaros, but concluded that it did not discredit the testimony of the
complainant, Delores Lazaros. The court attributed Barbara's conviction to the complainant's
testimony, as the alleged offense took place while Peter Lazaros was in prison, and concluded
that the new evidence was not sufficient to render a different result probable on retrial. Id.
The discovery that testimony introduced at trial was perjured, however, may be grounds
for ordering a new trial in Michigan. Id. Barbara contended that the polygraph results he
offered would have facilitated his demonstration, and the hearing judge's determination, that
Peter Lazaros committed perjury. Specifically, if the jury would believe his new witness, then
the credibility of both Peter and Delores Lazaros would be impeached. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at
174-75. In this context it should be noted that when newly discovered evidence is positive as to
the accused's innocence, the technical rules of evidence may be relaxed. See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 89 S.C. 41, 44, 71 S.E. 291, 292 (1911); State v. Laper, 26 S.D. 151, 157-58, 128 N.W.
476, 479 (1910).
Although movant offered the result of his own favorable polygraph examination, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the offer was merely duplicative of Barbara's denial of guilt
and, therefore, not new evidence. 400 Mich. at - n.2. 255 N.W.2d at 175 n.2.
17. 400 Mich. at -, -, 255 N.W.2d at 174, 199. The purpose of a post-conviction hearing
for a new trial based on newly found evidence is, as its name suggests, an action to determine
whether, in the interests of justice, new evidence is of sufficient importance to entitle a party to
a new trial. Four basic requirements must be met before a court will grant a new trial because of
newly discovered evidence. Movant must show that: (1) The evidence itself, not merely its
materiality, is newly discovered; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) the evidence is such as
to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause; and (4) the party could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at trial. People v. Clark, 363 Mich. 643,
647, 110 N.W.2d 638, 640 (1961).
18. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Barbara leave to appeal, but the Michigan
Supreme Court granted leave. No. 15815 (Mich. Ct. App., docketed March 23, 1973), appeal
granted, 391 Mich. 761 (1974).
19. The Barbara court cited two reasons for its refusal to reject the Frye rule: (1) The
field of polygraphy is still challenged forcefully on theoretical grounds; and (2) the results of
polygraphy have yet to achieve a predictable level of consistency among examiners, despite
significant progress in recent years. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Commonwealth
v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421, 429, 313 N.E.2d 120, 125 (1974)).
20. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 199.
21. Justice Coleman, in his dissenting opinion, contended that the majority's "argument
that a motion for a new trial requires lesser standards of proof than a trial itself and, therefore,
we should experiment with an admittedly unreliable source of evidence, is unpersuasive." Id.
at -, 255 N.W.2d at 202 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
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Characterizing a new trial hearing as a "preliminary procedure" in which a
defendant's guilt or innocence is not at issue, 22 the Barbaracourt noted that
a judge may use certain data, such as affidavits, which would be inadmis23
sible at trial, to assist in rendering his decision.
The Barbara court then held that judges hearing post-conviction motions for new trials may in their discretion consider the results of polygraph
examinations provided that the results of the test are offered on the defendant's behalf, the test was taken voluntarily, the examiner's qualifications,
the quality of the equipment and the procedures employed are approved, the
test results are considered only with regard to the general credibility of the
new witness, and all knowledge of the test is barred from the trier of fact in a
new trial. 24 The court emphasized that its limitations on the permissible use
of the polygraph in court kept its holding "well within the limits prescribed
by the state of the art" and avoided "prematurely considering those policy
questions which inevitably accompany use of such evidence at trial. "25 A
two-fold advantage to limited admission of polygraph evidence was acknowledged by the Barbaracourt. The test results could assist the defendant in demonstrating, and the judge in determining, that a newly discovered
witness is credible without casting the polygraph in a decisive role. In
addition, the courts would have the opportunity to establish a "track re26
cord" of polygraph reliability under strictly controlled conditions.
The historical roots of Barbara can be traced back to Frye v. United
States,27 which marked the first attempt to introduce polygraph evidence in
court. In that case defendant sought to introduce an expert to testify at trial
about the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, 28 a forerunner to
the modem polygraph. In excluding the evidence, the Frye court said:
22. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 197.
23. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 199. The court conceded, though, that "experimentation
would be unwise when an individual's life or freedom might hinge directly on the effect at trial

of a questionable device." Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at

198.

24. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 197-98.
25. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198.
26. Id. One of the strongest contentions against the admission of polygraph evidence has

been its scientifically unsubstantiated reliability. See Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961). For a thorough discussion of
case law and scientific information concluding that the polygraph is highly accurate, see Note,
The Emergence of the Polygraphat Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1120 (1973).
27. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. A systolic blood pressure deception test simply recorded blood pressure and pulse.
The modem polygraph records not only blood pressure and pulse but also respiration and
galvanic skin reflex or electrodermal response. See J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION:
THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETEcrOR") TECHNIQUE 1-3 (1966).
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thingfrom which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general
29
acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs.
Academic criticism has since been leveled against the Frye standard of
general scientific acceptance on the ground that it is an unnecessarily strict
test for the admission of scientific evidence, amounting in effect to a
rigorous rule of judicial notice. 30 Frye, however, has long been adhered to
by the great majority of jurisdictions, and remains today the leading case on
the subject.3 1 The Frye standard was first enunciated in Michigan in People
29. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
30. An expert witness offering scientific testimony usually applies a general scientific
principle (conscious deception causes internal stress which, in turn, produces unconscious
physiological changes) to specific data or evidence (abnormal blood pressure, respiration or
galvanic skin response) in an effort to reach a conclusion relevant to the issues of the particular
case (witness credibility). The validity of the principle underlying the technique may be so
widely accepted, as in handwriting analysis, fingerprinting and ballistics, that judicial notice of
it will be taken by a court without the necessity of establishing a foundation through expert
testimony. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94 (1972); Tarlow, Admissibility of
PolygraphEvidence in 1975: An Aid in DeterminingCredibilityIn a Perjury-PlaguedSystem, 26
HASTINGS L. REV. 917, 941 (1975). Although critics of the Frye rule concede that the general
acceptance standard is appropriate for taking judicial notice of scientific assertions, they do
note believe it is a proper standard for gauging the admission of scientific evidence. "Any
relevant conclusions [from scientific evidence] which are supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion." MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 9. See also Kaplan, The Lie Detector:An Analysis of its Placein
the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 386 (1964).
31. See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 506. Although Frye has been followed in the
vast majority of jurisdictions, the Barbaracourt cited two federal cases and one state case that
have called the Frye rule into question: United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970) (sub silentio substitution of a different rule for Frye);
United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (substitution of a more lenient test
than Frye); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421,313 N.E.2d 120 (1974) (special
exception to the Frye rule created when defendant agrees in advance to take a polygraph test
and submit the tests irrespective of results). The Barbara court called these cases
"anomalies." 400 Mich. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 186; cf. People v. McLaughlin, 3 Mich. App. 391,
393, 142 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1966) (fact of polygraph examination admissible at trial without
objection).
Although no appellate court has specifically rejected Frye, in United States v. Ridling,
350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
rejected the Frye court's conclusion. The Ridling court declared that the scientific basis for the
polygraph examination was well established and directly relevant to that case (a perjury case).
Id. at 93, 95.
The complete requirements established by the Ridling court for the admission of polygraph
evidence in trials are:
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v. Becker.3 2 The Becker court held that the admissibility of polygraph
evidence would be contigent upon "testimony offered which would indicate
' 33
that there is at this time a general scientific recognition of such tests."
Michigan courts have relied on the Becker/Frye holdings and the subsequent
failure of the polygraph to gain general scientific approval in barring the
admission of polygraph evidence in most judicial contexts. 34 Although
courts in other states have allowed opposing parties to stipulate before the
test is administered that the results could be admitted into evidence,3 5 the
courts in Michigan have denied this option.3 6 Given Michigan's historical
intolerance for use of polygraph evidence in almost any judicial context, the
impact of the supreme court's decision in Barbara in favor of limited
admission of such evidence becomes all the more significant.
Prior to Barbara, the Michigan courts had twice confronted the issue
whether polygraph evidence could be used to aid in the evaluation of witness
credibility in a new trial hearing. 37 In both cases the Michigan Court of
Appeals relied on the Becker/Frye rule in denying the admission of such
1.The parties will meet and will recommend to the Court three competent polygraph
experts other than those offered by the defendant. 2. The Court will appoint one or
more of the experts to conduct a polygraph examination. 3. The defendant will
submit himself for such examination at an appointed time. 4. The expert appointed
by the Court will conduct the examination and report the results to the Court and to the
counsel for both the defendant and the government. 5. If the results show, in the
opinion of the expert, either that the defendant was telling the truth or that he was not
telling the truth on the issues directly involved in this case, the testimony of the
defendant's experts and the Court's expert will be admitted. 6. If the tests indicate
that the examiner cannot determine whether the defendant is or is not telling the truth,
none of the polygraph evidence will be admitted.
Id. at 99.
32. 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
33. Id.; accord, People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 68, 155 N.W.2d 830, 832 (1968);
People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 370, 72 N.W.2d 269, 281 (1955).
34. Results of polygraph examination or any reference to them are inadmissible evidence
in: (1)
Competency hearings, People v. Liddell, 63 Mich. App. 491, 495, 234 N.W.2d 669, 672
(1975); (2) presentence reports, People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 152, 211 N.W.2d 533, 535
(1973); (3) sentencing proceedings, People v. Towns, 69 Mich. App. 475,478,245 N.W.2d 97, 99
(1976); and (4) civil proceedings, Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 610, 50 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951).
35. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964);
State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216
N.W.2d 8 (1974).
36. Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); People v. Levelston, 54 Mich.
App. 477, 221 N.W.2d 235 (1974).
37. People v. Alexander, 72 Mich. App. 91,249 N.W.2d 307 (1976); People v. Sinclair, 21
Mich. App. 255, 175 N.W.2d 893 (1970). The court in Barbaraalso cited two cases from other
jurisdictions, United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and State v. Scott,
210 Kan. 426, 502 P.2d 753 (1972), in which the issue whether polygraph evidence could be used
to buttress the credibility of the defendant in a new trial hearing had been considered. 400 Mich.
at - n.45, 255 N.W.2d at 197-98 n.45. Both courts denied the admissibilityof such evidence on
the ground that it was merely cumulative and inadmissible at trial. 179 F. Supp. at 280; 210 Kan.
at 434, 502 P.2d at 760.
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evidence. In People v. Sinclair,3 8 defendant, following his conviction for
armed robbery, moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
after an inmate at a state prison signed an affidavit stating that he, and not
defendant, had committed the crime in question. 39 A police administered
40
polygraph test indicated that the affiant's confession was a fabrication.
Statements by the judge hearing defendant's motion revealed that he gave
weight to the test results in denying Sinclair's motion for a new trial. 4 1 The
court of appeals, citing Becker, held that it was error to admit or to consider
42
the test results in the hearing for a new trial and remanded for rehearing.
The Sinclair court, unlike the Barbaracourt, failed to note any procedural
differences between a trial and a hearing following a motion for a new trial
that might warrant distinguishing Sinclair from previous decisions on the
polygraph.
Defendant in People v. Alexander 43 was convicted of armed robbery
and moved for a new trial based on newly found evidence. 44 In support of
his motion, defendant offered two new witnesses and was prepared to offer
polygraph evidence presumably supporting his innocence. 45 The hearing
judge refused to admit testimony that would lay a foundation for the
admission of the polygraph examination results and subsequently denied
defendant's motion for a new trial.4 6 The court of appeals affirmed and,
deferring to the supreme court's pending decision in Barbara, said, "Until
47
changed by the Supreme Court polygraph results are inadmissible." If
defendant's test results were offered to buttress the credibility of at least one
of the new witnesses, 48 then Barbara overrules sub silentio the court of
38. 21 Mich. App. 255, 175 N.W.2d 893 (1970).
39. Id. at 256, 175 N.W.2d at 894.

40. Id. at 257, 175 N.W.2d at 894.
41. The trial court made the following remark in the new trial hearing:
"They did put Mr. Todd on a polygraph to determine whether or not there was any

substance to his story. Although the results of a polygraph are not admissible in a
proceeding in court, nevertheless, it was the conclusion of the polygraph operator and
the police that this was a fabrication on the part of Mr. Todd merely to wipe off an
offense for Defendant Sinclair."
Id. (quoting trial court).

42. Id. at 258, 175 N.W.2d at 894-95 (citing People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d
503 (1942)).
43. 72 Mich. App. 91, 249 N.W.2d 307 (1976).

44. Id. at 97, 249 N.W.2d at 308. Alexander's newly found evidence consisted in part of a
new witness, a friend of defendant, who allegedly knew who committed the robbery for which
Alexander was convicted. Id. at 93-94, 249 N.W.2d at 308-09.
45. Id. at 97, 249 N.W.2d at 309-10. It is unclear from the court's opinion in Alexander
whether the polygraph test results were offered to support the testimony of defendant, of the
new witnesses, or of both.
46. Id. at 97, 249 N.W.2d at 310.

47. Id.
48. If the polygraph evidence was offered only to buttress defendant's own credibility,

that evidence was cumulative under the court's opinion in Barbara. See note 16 supra.
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appeals' holding in Alexander.49
The Barbaradecision constitutes a limited victory for advocates of a
more liberal rule for the admission of polygraph evidence. The Michigan
Supreme Court, in deciding Barbara, apparently reassessed the counterbalancing factors traditionally advanced for excluding polygraph evidence at
trial. Few critics of the polygraph today would contend that the opinion of a
qualified polygraph expert has no probative value in assessing the sincerity
of his examinee.5 0 Even prior to Barbarathe Michigan Supreme Court went
so far as to take judicial notice of the fact that the polygraph is a useful
investigative device. 5 ' In the past, however, the probative value of the
polygraph has been outweighed by judicial fear of the prejudicial effect of
such evidence upon the trier of a defendant's guilt or innocence.1 2 Because
of the polygraph's misleading reputation as a "truth teller," courts have
demanded that the opinion of a polygraph expert be almost infallible because the trier of fact will invariably think it so. 53 By barring the results of a
polygraph examination from the trier of fact in a new trial, and by strictly
limiting the admission of such evidence to new trial hearings in which new
witness credibility is a central issue, Barbara minimizes the prejudicial
effect of polygraph evidence while maximizing its probative value. Relevant
evidence is presumably yielded through admission of polygraph evidence in
this judicial. context. The question remains, however, whether the probative
value of the polygraph, even without its prejudicial effect on the jury, is still
sufficient to warrant the time-consuming procedures mandated for courtapproved admissibility. 54
49. Barbara does not overrule the court of appeals decision in Sinclair because the

polygraph evidence in the new trial hearing was unfavorable to defendant. See text accompanying note 24 supra.

50. See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 507.
51. People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 313, 235 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (1975).
52. MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 507; see, e.g., United States v. Stromberg, 179 F.

Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (admission of polygraph evidence at trial would be tantamount
to overturning the jury system); People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 372,72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955)

("The tremendous weight which such tests would necessarily carry in the minds of a jury
requires us to be most careful regarding their admission into evidence and we should not do so
before its accuracy and general scientific acceptance and standardization are clearly shown.");
People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511,'518, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430,435 (1969) ("We
are all aware of the tremendous weight which such tests would necessarily have in the minds of
a jury.").
53. MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 507. Courts in Michigan had.likewise barred the
results of polygraph examinations from new trial hearings because of the presumed prejudicial
effect of such tests on the judge. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 211 N.W.2d 533
(1973); People v. Sinclair, 21 Mich. App. 255, 175 N.W.2d 893 (1970); cf. People v. Towns, 69
Mich. App. 475, 245 N.W.2d 97 (1976) (error for sentencing judge to have knowledge of
polygraph examination results).
54. To lay a proper foundation for the admission of polygraph evidence in a new trial
hearing in accordance with the Barbara court's requirements, the polygraph examiner, his
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Barbara constitutes a new limitation on the scope of the Frye rule in
Michigan. Although the court reaffirmed its support of Becker/Frye with
respect to the admission of polygraph evidence at trial, 55 the exclusionary
barrier of general scientific acceptance first raised in Frye was not applied
with respect to new trial hearings. Demonstrated probative value, as opposed to demonstrated scientific approval, now appears to be the standard
for the admission of polygraph evidence in Michigan new trial hearings
based on newly found evidence. 56 Barbarais itself a conservative refinement of the holdings of those few courts that have admitted polygraph
evidence at trial.5 7 While the polygraph's usefulness in gauging witness
credibility is employed in such cases, Barbara's implementation alone
succeeds in eliminating the instrument's prejudicial effect on the jury.
The new trial hearing has been designated the appropriate judicial
"lab" for testing the polygraph's reliability, 5 but the Barbara court's
characterization of the new trial hearing as a preliminary procedure is
misleading. While such a hearing may be merely a proceeding preliminary
to trial, it may also, in effect, be the defendant's final attack on the
conviction. The judge ultimately determines whether the new trial hearing is
a preliminary or final proceeding because he is the trier of the sufficiency of
the evidence 59 and is not himself shielded from the prejudicial effect of the
test results. The Barbara court implicitly recognized this problem by
limiting the admissibility of polygraph evidence to test results favorable to
the defendant.' One can only speculate what effect a defendant's omission
in providing such test results will now have on the hearing judge's discretion
6
to grant or to deny a motion for new trial. '
equipment and the procedures employed must be approved by the court. Furthermore, the

examinee may be subjected to a second, and conceivably a third, polygraph test upon the
request of the prosecutor or the court. 400 Mich. at -,

255 N.W.2d at 197-98. These procedures

may be too involved to provide a conclusion the judge could make on the basis of his own
powers of observation. See United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1365-67 (C.D. Cal.
1973). But cf. Tarlow, supra note 30, at 958 (the objection that admission of polygraph evidence
would require prolonged adjudication in each case is a "minor" one).
55. 400 Mich. at -,

255 N.W.2d at 186; see note 19 and accompanying text supra.

56. Cf. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 687-88 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Frye has been interpreted to demand general acceptance among the experts
that current polygraph techniques possess a degree of reliability which satisfies the court of its
probative value."); Tarlow, supra note 30, at 945-46 (the interpretation of Frye's "general
acceptance" as "reliable enough to have probative value" would appear close to the traditional
standard for the admission of scientific evidence).
57. See note 31 supra.
58. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198-99; see text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
59. See, e.g., People v. Sinclair, 21 Mich. App. at 258, 175 N.W.2d at 895.

60. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198; see text accompanying note 24 supra.
61. New trial hearing judges in Michigan may now come to expect defendants to submit
polygraph examination results with their new witnesses Failure to provide such results may
improperly influence the judge in the same manner as the judge's knowledge of a defendant's
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Permitting limited admission of polygraph evidence in a hearing upon a
motion for new trial is a novel compromise between the strict evidentiary
standard of general scientific acceptance and the liberal rules of relevant
evidence. Barbarapreserves the sanctity of the trial from a "questionable
device," but permits the court to test the utility of the polygraph under
strictly controlled conditions. If the polygraph fails to demonstrate its
reliability in gauging witness sincerity within the confines of new trial
hearings, the Barbaracourt has limited adequately the effect of its decision
through the numerous conditions imposed on the permissible use and purpose of such evidence.62 Conversely, if the polygraph succeeds in demonstrating its reliability in assessing witness credibility, the Frye standard of
general scientific acceptance should be satisfied and the door properly
opened to the general admission of polygraph evidence for impeachment
purposes.
MICHAEL MORRIE JONES

Labor Law-Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach
to the Problems of Campaign Regulation
In accordance with its authority under the Labor Management Relations Act to regulate union election campaigns, 1 the National Labor Relations Board has developed a complex set of election standards to protect
employee "freedom of choice" 2 in voting for or against union representation. The Board conceives of free choice not simply as an uncoerced
refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Cf. People v. Towns, 69 Mich. App. 475, 245
N.W.2d 97 (1976) (improper for trial court to induce defendant to take polygraph test prior t1
sentencing even though court told defendant that refusal to take the test would not affect the
sentence); People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 211 N.W.2d 533 (1973) (improper to ask
defendant if he were willing to take a polygraph test).
62. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
1. Section 9(c)(1) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §

159(c)(1) (1970), states in part, "[If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a

question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the

results thereof." The Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision under § 9(c) of the National

Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 453 (1936), to give the Board authority to

promulgate regulations necessary to conduct a fair election. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31, 37 (1942); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
2. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962).
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To promote

such rational decisionmaking by employees, the Board seeks in the elections
it supervises to "provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible." 5 This "laboratory
conditions" ideal has provided a rationale under which the Board has
developed extensive rules for determining when conduct or speech by either
employer or union will be grounds for setting aside an election. 6 As part of
this development, for over two decades the Board has held that a substantial
misrepresentation by either side that could be found to have had a probable
impact on the election would be a sufficient basis for invalidating an election
and ordering another. 7 In an unexpected decision8 in April, 1977, however,
the Board reversed this long-standing policy and declared in Shopping Kart
Food Market9 that it will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of
campaign statements, or set aside elections on the basis of alleged misrepresentations. 10 Beyond its effect of deregulating one facet of election practices, Shopping Kart illustrates the limitations of the Board's adjudicative
approach to policymaking and the desirability of the Board's effectuating

any further changes in its campaign regulations in a comprehensive, rather
than piecemeal, manner.
3. Coercion of employees is expressly prohibited under § 8(a)(1) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), which makes any action that
interferes with, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their rights under § 7 of the
Act, id. § 157, an unfair labor practice. Section 7 provides that employees have the right of selforganization and the right to form or join labor organizations.
4. The Board has stated:
Our function. . . is to conduct elections in'which the employees have the opportunity
to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in an atmosphere conducive to
the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from interference,
restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from other elements which prevent
or impede a reasoned choice.
Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70 (1962).
5. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
6. See text accompanying notes 24-33 infra.
7. Notable cases in the Board's development of controls over misrepresentations include
United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953) (election invalidated when one union fabricated
a letter from the president of a second union admitting election misconduct and praising the first
union), and Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955) (election set aside because of
union's misrepresentation concerning wages negotiated with another employer). See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
8. The Board did not indicate before Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 N.L.R.B. No.
190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (Apr. 8, 1977), that it was considering a reevaluation of its long-standing
policy on misrepresentations. Thus, counsel for both sides were not able to submit briefs or
orally argue the merits of the policy change. Motion for Reconsideration I (copy on file in office
of North CarolinaLaw Review). Following the Board's decision, counsel for both the employer
and the union argued that the record should be reopened for oral and written argument on the
change in policy. Id.; Brief in Reply to Employer's Motion for Reconsideration (copy on file in
office of North CarolinaLaw Review).
9. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (Apr. 8, 1977).
10. Id. at -,

-,

94 L.R.R.M. at 1705, 1708.
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In Shopping Kart, a union official told employees on the day preceding
the election that the employer had earned profits of $500,000 in the past
year, although actually they had totalled only $50,000.11 The employer lost
the election and challenged the results, alleging that the misrepresentation
had caused the union's victory. The Regional Director, applying the Board's
policy on misrepresentations as articulated in Hollywood Ceramics Co. ,12
according to which only material misrepresentations would invalidate an
election, found that the misrepresentation was not material. 13 The Board,
although agreeing with the Regional Director that the union should be
certified, determined in a three to two decision to overrule Hollywood
14
Ceramics altogether.
In the majority opinion, Board members Penello and Walther argued
that the Board's painstaking, subjective determinations of the probable
impact on employees of election misrepresentations had resulted in inconsistent rulings, an increased number of objections and a delay in the final
outcome of elections. 5 The problem of delay had been exacerbated, they
noted, by the frequent refusal of the courts to enforce Board decisions,
which had encouraged parties to litigate to the fullest.' 6 The majority
contended that the negative effects of Board control over misrepresentations
could no longer be justified since an influential empirical study had shown
that employees are not influenced by election campaigns anyway. 17 Thus,
they concluded, "[Tihe Hollywood Ceramics rule operates more to frustrate
free choice than to further it and. . . the purposes of the Act would be
better served by its demise."' 8 Although ex-Chairman Murphy joined
Penello and Walther in overruling Hollywood Ceramics, she stated in a
concurring opinion that she will continue to vote to set aside elections in
which a party makes an "egregious mistake of fact."' 19 The three members
11. Id. at-,

94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
12. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); see text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
13. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705. The Regional Director found that the union
official had neither actual nor imputed knowledge of the employer's profits. Id.; see note 38 and
text accompanying notes 32 & 33, 38-41 infra.
14. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
15. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706-07. The majority also criticized the Hollywood

Ceramics policy for its effect of restricting free speech. Id. Although this has been a major
criticism leveled at the Board in connection with this policy, see note 28 infra, the Shopping
Kart majority did not emphasize the issue.
16. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
17. Id. The empirical study relied on by the majority is discussed in notes 64, 71-76 and

text accompanying notes 64-76 infra.
18. 228 N.L.R.B. at -,

94 L.R R.M. at 1708.

19. Id. (concurring opinion). Unfortunately, Murphy did not define any standard for an

"egregious" misrepresentation except by negative implication. She stated that she would find
such election interference "only in the most extreme situations" and would not set aside
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were in total agreement, however, in holding that the Board would continue
to invalidate elections on the basis of forgeries and misrepresentations
20
involving Board processes.
In a strongly worded dissent, members Fanning and Jenkins argued that
it was only through its regulations that the Board maintained a high standard
of campaign conduct in a majority of elections 21 and that the Board's
abandonment of its regulatory role would lead to an increase in propaganda
and misrepresentations. 22 The dissent also attacked the behavioral study that
23
the majority relied on to support its decision.
The policy established in Shopping Kart of not examining the substance of campaign representations is not new to the Board. Between 1935
and 1947, the Board intervened only rarely in cases of union misrepresentations; employers, on the other hand, were held to a standard of strict
neutrality.24 In 1947, Congress, in an attempt to ensure greater latitude to
employers in speaking against unionization in election campaigns, adopted
section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which removed most speech from the
ambit of unfair labor practices. 25 In response, in GeneralShoe Corp.26 the
Board held that section 8(c) applied only to unfair labor practices, and that
campaign speech would continue to be subject to regulation under the
Board's section 9(c) 27 power over election practices, regardless of any
elections on the basis of "gross errors" or examine statements "for mere truth or falsity." Id.
As examples of elections she would not set aside, Murphy cited two cases involving gross wage

misrepresentations by unions. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708-09 (citing Contract Knitter, Inc.,
220 N.L.R.B. 579 (1975); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 210 (1975)).
20. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708 (majority & concurring opinions).

21. Id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709 (dissenting opinion).
22. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10 (dissenting opinion). For a discussion of this study,
see notes 64, 71-76 and text accompanying notes 64-76 infra. Board member Jenkins dissented
further on the basis of his disagreement with the conclusions of the study. 228 N.L.R.B. at-,
94 L.R.R.M. at 1712.
24. See R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELEcTION CONDUCT
17-19 (Univ. of Pa. Wharton School Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974)

[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS]; Christensen, FreeSpeech, Propagandaand the NationalLabor
Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 243, 255-63 (1963). See Note, Limitations upon an Employer's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REV. 1037 (1952), for a compilation of cases
that enforced the policy of strict employer noninterference.
25. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970)
provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of § 8(c), see Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399
(1960).
26. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
27. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970),
quoted in note 1 supra.
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immunity under section 8(c). 28 This policy was subsequently applied to both
employers and unions.
After 1947, the Board, through case-by-case adjudication, gradually
established a set of criteria to be used in judging the impact of a misrepresentation on an election. 29 These criteria were summarized by the Board in
1962 in Hollywood Ceramics Co. ,3o which became the definitive statement
of the Board's misrepresentation policy:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time
which prevents the other party . . . from making an effective

reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not,
may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
election . ...

But even where a misrepresentation is . . . sub-

stantial, the Board may still refuse to set aside the election if it
finds.

.

.

that the statement would not be likely to have had a real

impact on the election. For example, the misrepresentation might
have occurred in connection with an unimportant matter. .

.

. Or,

it could have been so extreme as to put the employees on notice of
its lack of truth. .

. Or, the Board may find that the employees

possessed
independent knowledge with which to evaluate the state31
ments.

32
An additional consideration, which had been articulated in previous cases,
was added in a footnote to Hollywood Ceramics3 -whether the informant's
knowledge of the subject matter that was misrepresented was so special that
it would induce employees to attach unusual significance to the misstatement.
In applying the Hollywood Ceramics standards, the Board has had to
make a series of subjective determinations in every case; as a result, Board
28. 77 N.L.R.B. at 126, 127; see

WILLIAMS,

supra note 24, at 19-20; Christensen, supra

note 24, at 258-62.
The General Shoe policy has been frequently attacked by Board critics. A Senate report
found that the Board's regulation of campaign speech under § 9 is "in conflict with the spirit of
section 8(c)" and noted that "the idea that speech of any kind, much less 'protected speech' can
invalidate an election is unacceptable outside of labor law, and is dubious within it." Excerpts
from the Report of the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 120 CONG. REC. 11304 (1974). But see Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations
Board; Herein of 'Employer Persuasion, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 594, 612-16 (1954) (use of the
banner of freedom of speech to characterize employers' expressions of opinion to their

employees about unionization is misleading).
29. See, e.g., Kawneer Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1460, 1461 (1958); Calidyne Co., 117 N.L.R.B.
1026, 1028 (1957); Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093-94 (1955); Merck & Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1953); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 20-25.
30. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
31. Id. at 224 (footnotes omitted).
32. See, e.g., Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1094 (1955).
33. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224 n.10.
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decisions in misrepresentation cases have been inconsistent and frequently
have been overturned by the courts.14 Evaluating the substantiality of a
misrepresentation has required the Board to decide what degree of departure
from the truth in each case is actually significant.3 5 When a misrepresentation has been judged to be substantial the Board then has had to decide how
much time was needed for an effective rebuttal, and, in cases in which the
opposition has not responded to the misrepresentation, whether it could have
so responded. 36 Determining the materiality of a misrepresentation has
involved the Board in difficult examinations of the relative importance of
the issues in each campaign. 37 Finally, in considering the credibility of the
source of the misrepresentation and employees' knowledge about the subject
of the misrepresentation, the Board has had to evaluate the employees' state
of mind and receptivity. 38 The Board has said numerous times that it does
not look for evidence of employees' actual knowledge, 39 but instead makes
34. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 28-61; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
RepresentationElections Under the NationalLabor RelationsAct, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 82-90
(1964).
35. The subjectivity inherent in this type of determination has led to inconsistency in
application. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 28-33; Bok, supra note 34, at 84-86. Compare,
e.g., Cross Baking Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 199 (1970), rev'd, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971) (wage
misrepresentation amounting to 15 cents an hour was not substantial), with Kawneer Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 1460 (1958) (union's representation that hourly wages elsewhere were $1.81 and
vacation time was two weeks when actually wages ranged from $1.73 to $1.90 and vacation time
was one week was substantial) and Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962) (inference fostered by
employer that union dues were five dollars a month whan they were actually four dollars a
month was substantial).
36. For examples of Board-court disagreement over the application of the timing standard, see Aircraft Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1975) (Board and court reached
different conclusions on effectiveness of employer's rebuttal to a prior union misrepresentation); NLRB v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1972) (Board and court applied
different standards concerning responsibility of employer to investigate and respond to union's
misrepresentation made four days prior to election); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 39-46.
37. The Board and the courts have frequently disagreed in applying the materiality
standard. See NLRB v. Santee River Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1976) (Board's
finding that false assertion by union that one employee had been illegally discharged was
immaterial since the company had in fact illegally discharged other employees reversed);
Luminator Div. of Gulton Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (Board's decision
that union misrepresentation of wages and benefits received under a different contract was
immaterial reversed); NLRB v. Graphic Arts Finishing Co., 380 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Board's determination concerning the materiality of claims about union strike benefits set
aside); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 33-39.
38. One study of Board decisions in this area has found that:
[Trhe Board's decisions reflect a fundamental ambivalence as to how much emphasis
should be placed upon the voters' own abilities to recognize campaign propoganda for
what it is and either disregard it or take independent steps to verify it before voting in
reliance thereon. In some cases, the Board appears to have regarded the employees as
exceptionally naive and in need of extensive protection from the agency. In others, the
Board has seemed willing to impose a high degree of responsibility on the voters...
to protect themselves from being misled by campaign claims.
WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 57.
39. Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1077 n.3 (1959); 41
NLRB ANN. REP. 66 (1976). See also Bok, supra note 34, at 40 n.8; Note, Behavioraland NonBehavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation Cases, 45 IND. L.J. 276, 284 (1970).
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its own judgment, based on its "administrative expertise," as to what
employees might reasonably be expected to know. 4° Though this approach
has maximized the Board's administrative flexibility, it has done so at the
sacrifice of a clearly defined standard.4 1
The subjectivity of the determinations inherent in the application of the
Hollywood Ceramics standards has given the courts of appeals the latitude
42
to make independent factual determinations in misrepresentation cases,
despite pleas from the Board that such determinations are more properly
within the purview of its administrative powers.4 3 The courts also have at
times refused to apply all the standards,' or have applied additional standards, 45 and have sometimes enforced the standards with a rigidity explicitly
40. Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
41. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 48. The fact that earlier Board decisions focused on the
actual special knowledge of the source of the misrepresentation whereas later cases looked
more to the reliance of employees has also impeded formulation of a clear standard in this area.
Id. at 46-51. Different Board members often apply different formulations of the standard and
arrive at different results. See, e.g., Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 312
(1974). In some cases, the Board has applied the earlier test, focusing on the actual knowledge
of the speaker, but the courts, setting aside orders, have reached different results based on a
standard that focuses more on reliance. See NLRB v. A.G. Pollard Co., 393 F.2d 239 (1st Cir.
1968); WILLIAMS, supra at 46-51.
The Board has further contributed to the confusion at times by failing to look to the source
of the misrepresentation when it would be appropriate. See, e.g., Medical Ancillary Servs.,
Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 582, 583 (1974) (Penello dissenting) (majority set aside an election because
of misleading statements made by a union stewardess who did not occupy a position of
authority or have any special knowledge about the matters at issue).
Board member Jenkins has at times apparently ignored the source factor in overturning
elections. See, e.g., Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239 (1975); Medical Ancillary Servs., Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. 582 (1974). However, in Shopping Kart, Jenkins and Fanning stressed the importance of the source factor in concluding that, even under Hollywood Ceramics, the election
should not be overturned. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
42. See, e.g., Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974);
Walled Lake Door Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1973); Luminator Div. of Gulton
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. G.K. Turner Assocs., 457 F.2d
484 (9th Cir. 1972); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (Ist Cir. 1971).
43. There must be a reasonably flexible and not too constrained or rigidly controlled
area left for administrative expertise in determining, in the best judgment we can
muster from our knowledge and experience in the field, and in the exercise of sound
administrative discretion, what circumstances justify either invalidating an election or
holding a hearing on misrepresentation issues.
Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 530 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
44. In particular, the courts have resisted considering whether the source had special
knowledge, and whether the employees' independent knowledge would largely counter the
misrepresentation, on the grounds that these considerations allow the guilty party to escape
unpunished. See LaCrescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir.
1975); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Millard Metal Serv. Center, Inc., 472 F.2d 647 (Ist Cir. 1973); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 54.
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Santee River Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208, 1211 (4th Cir.
1976) (considering the element of deliberateness or intentionality in determining the effect of
the misrepresentation on employees); Aircraft Radio Corp. v.NLRB, 519 F.2d 590, 593-94 (3d
Cir. 1975) (considering both deliberateness and the closeness of the original election vote);
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rejected by the Board in Hollywood Ceramics.46 These conflicts between
the Board and the courts have resulted in an enforcement rate in misrepresentation cases that is much lower than the enforcement rate for Board
decisions in general. 47
An examination of the measurable effects of the Board's past regulation of misrepresentations shows that the negative results have outweighed
the benefits. Although Hollywood Ceramics objections to elections have not
48
necessarily become routine as implied by the majority in Shopping Kart,
the number of objections based on alleged misrepresentations have constituted a large proportion of post-election objections. 49 Very few of these
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 1136, 1139-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (stressing the element
of the deliberateness of the misrepresentation).
46. The Board expressed a realistic view of election campaigning in Hollywood Ceramics:
We are. . . aware that absolute precision of statement and complete honesty are not
always attainable .

. .

. Election campaigns are often hotly contested and feelings

frequently run high. At such times a party may, in its zeal, overstate its own virtues
and the vices of the other without essentially impairing "laboratory conditions."
140 N.L.R.B. at 223-24. This view has not been consistently followed by either the Board or the
courts. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 28-33; Bok, supra note 34, at 88. The classic statement
of an idealistic approach to elections was made in a case that predated Hollywood Ceramics:
"If truth is diluted, it is no longer truth. A glass of pure water is no longer pure if a one-ninth
part thereof is contaminated, nor is it 'virtually' pure. There cannot be 'virtually' the truth any
more than there can be 'virtually' a virgin." Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 261 F.2d 613,
616 (7th Cir. 1958).
One reason for the courts' rigidity may be the perception by the courts of a pro-union bias
on the part of the Board. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 57-59; see Automation & Measurement
Div., The Bendix Corp. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 141, 146 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Lord Baltimore
Press, Inc., 370 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1966).
47. The courts have refused to enforce 51.1% of the Board's decisions in misrepresentation cases; in contrast, the set-aside rate for Board decisions in general is 14.7%. Speech by
Peter Walther to State Bar Ass'n of Texas (June 17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Walther],
reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP. (CCII) 9126A, at 15,474.
48. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706 (citing WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 60). The
criticism by the majority does not seem to be well founded. As the dissent noted, 300 to 400
yearly challenges based on misrepresentations out of a total of approximately 9,000 elections
indicates that challenges are not routine. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion).
49. According to ex-Board member Walther, employer objections based on misrepresentations constituted I of every 4 employer election objections filed in fiscal year 1976. Walther,
supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP. (CCII) 9126A, at 15,473. However, since
employers filed 223 misrepresentation objections, Shopping Kart, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion); see note 50 infra, out of a total 493 election objections,
41 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 39, at 232 app., table I IC, it appears the ratio is closer to I out
of 2. Of the 678 union election objections in 1976, id., 84 were based on alleged misrepresentations. Shopping Kart, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion); see note 50
infra.
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objections, however, have been sustained. 50 Furthermore, the number of
51
changed outcomes resulting from rerun elections has been even smaller.
By far the most significant practical effect of the regulation of misrepresentations has been the delay in obtaining final results in challenged elections;
in 1976 final election results were delayed by litigation from 286 days to 4
years. 52 Any advantage a union gains from such litigation5 3 is relatively
slight compared to what an employer gains. As ex-Board member Walther
50. Misrepresentations alleged to
have been made by unions
1971-174
1972-176
1973-240
1974-142
1975-245
1976-223
Misrepresentations alleged to have
been made by employers
1971-205
1972-150
1973-210
1974-104
1975-207
1976- 84

Percent of objections
sustained
1.7
9.1
3.8
10.6
4.1
3.6
Percent of objections
sustained
10.7
11.3
10.0
15.4
7.2
21.4

228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion).
51. In 1976, 18 rerun elections were ordered in response to union objections and 8 in
response to employer objections. Walther, supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) 9126A, at 15,473. In fiscal year 1976, approximately 40% of all rerun elections resulted
in outcomes different from the original election. 41 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 39, at 232
app., table I IC. Therefore, the 26 reruns probably yielded 10 or 11 changed outcomes.
52. Misrepresentation cases that eventually reach the courts of appeals require lengthy
litigation since Board determinations involving representation questions cannot be directly
appealed. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940). Therefore, if a union brings a misrepresentation charge and loses, the union cannot appeal. When an employer brings a misrepresentation
charge and loses, the union is certified. The employer, however, can refuse to bargain with the
victorious union and be found guilty of an unfair labor practice. On appeal of the unfair labor
practice finding, all questions, including those involving the original representation election, are
reviewable by the courts. Id. at 409-12.
In 1976, the 9 misrepresentation cases that went to the courts of appeals for enforcement of
Board orders were not decided until 1 1/2 to 4 years after the elections were originally held.
Although unions won in 5 of the 9 appeals, the time delay was sufficient to dissipate the union's
bargaining power. Lengthy delays also occurred in the 37 summary judgment bargaining orders
issued by the Board in misrepresentation cases. Walther, supra note 47, reportedin [1977] LAB.
L. REP. (CCH) 9126A, at 15,473. Even the fully contested misrepresentation cases that were
not appealed were, on the average, decided by the Board 286 days after the original election.
Speech by John Fanning before American Bar Ass'n in Chicago (Aug. 9, 1977), reported in
[1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 381, 384. Thus, even for cases not appealed to the courts, the
time consumed in fully contesting a misrepresentation charge and conducting a rerun probably
approximated a year, which coincides with the time established by statute after which a
defeated union can obtain a new election in any event. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
53. A union might be interested in filing an unwarranted objection so as to maintain an
employee nucleus at a partially organized plant. Samnff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and
Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 242 (1968).
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has observed, "[I]f effectuation of a certification can be delayed a year or
more . . . the union's following is dissipated and its strength at the bar54
gaining table nil."
Given the problems in application and enforcement of the Hollywood
Ceramics standards and the negative side effects of prolonged litigation, it
seems that the maintenance of the regulatory standards would be justifiable

only if they in fact have had a deterrent effect. Neither the majority nor the
dissent, however, analyzed the probability or strength of such a deterrent
effect. The majority side-stepped the issue by contending that employees are
not influenced by misrepresentations anyway. 55 The dissent, on the other
hand, assumed without question that the standards had successfully deterred
misrepresentations in ninety-five percent of the elections conducted in the
past year.56 The validity of this assertion is debatable considering the
vagueness of the standards and their subjective and often inconsistent
application. 57 The articulation of the standards on a case-by-case basis rather
than in clearly enunciated rules of general applicability probably has also
minimized their deterrent effect. 58 In addition, the impossibility of deterring
unintentional, careless or unauthorized misstatements, and the use of tactics
such as rumor-spreading, were not recognized by the dissent. 59 Given these
considerations, it is likely that undetected violations have occurred in
numerous elections 60 and that more objections have not been filed because
54. Walther, supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9126A, at 15,473. An
employer is also encouraged to file an objection by considerations of the possible money
savings that might accrue if bargaining is delayed and of the increased possibility of success if
the case eventually is appealed to the courts. See Bok, supra note 34, at 87; Samoff, supra
note 53, at 237.
55. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707. The majority implied that since employees
are not influenced by misrepresentations it is unnecessary to deter misrepresentations. This
proposition is questionable, however, since the conclusions of the study cited by the majority
for the proposition that employees are not influenced by campaign misrepresentations, see note
64 and text accompanying notes 64-67 infra, were based on studies of elections conducted
under the Hollywood Ceramicsstandards. It is arguable that these standards generally helped to
deter gross misrepresentations in the elections studied and that, were employees subjected to
totally unregulated campaigning, there would be a greater impact on employee voting. See
Miller, The Getman, Goldberg and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (1976).
56. 228 N.L.R.B. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10 (dissenting opinion). One Board critic has
described such faith as an "unwarranted confidence in the capacity of the law." Samoff, supra
note 53, at 247.
57. See notes 35-38, 41 and text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
58. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 590 (1970); Bok, supra note 34, at 92; Peck, The
Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National LaborRelationsBoard, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 759
(1961); Wirtz, supra note 28, at 616.
59. See Bok, supra note 34, at 86, 87 & n.132 (rumor-spreading is an effective, unregulated way of communicating misinformation). See also Samoff, supra note 53, at 240.
60. This conclusion is supported by data showing that employees reported campaign
violations in as many elections that the Board later found to be "clean" as in those that the
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of the cost and the improbability of success upon Board review. 61 Despite
the improbability that the Board's standards have, in fact, acted as an
effective deterrent, the majority's remedy of total deregulation of campaign
speech would seem less drastic and be more defensible had the Board
considered testimony from unions and management concerning the actual
62
deterrent effect of the now-discarded regulations.
Although considerations of inconsistent results, Board-court conflict
and prolonged litigation were important factors motivating the Shopping
Kart decision, these considerations were all articulated in 1973 when in
Modine Manufacturing Co. 63 the Board expressly declined to overrule
Hollywood Ceramics. Thus, the key to the Shopping Kart decision appears
to lie in the reexamination of the behavioral assumption underlying
Hollywood Ceramics: that employees are actually influenced by campaigns.
This reexamination apparently was provoked, at least in part, by an influential empirical study of employee voting behavior (the Getman study)' 4
which found, following an examination of thirty-one elections in five
midwestern states, that eighty-one percent of the employees surveyed voted
according to their precampaign attitudes and intent,6 5 and that, in general,
employees did not remember most campaign issues. 6 6 From this and other
data, the authors of the study concluded that employees are generally
inattentive to campaigns, and that their vote is not determined by informa67
tion received during campaigns.
Influential observers of the Board have long noted the need for an
empirical study of employee behavior that would test the behavioral asBoard later overturned. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 117-18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GETMAN].
61. See note 50 supra.

62. Testimony might have shown, for example, that standards of election behavior with
regard to misrepresentations are largely self-imposed. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
63. 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 529-31 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
64. GETMAN, supra note 60. The study also appeared in two parts: Getman & Goldberg,
The BehavioralAssumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation of CampaignMisrepresentations:
An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976), and Getman, Goldberg & Herman,

NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board
Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (1975).
The purpose of the study was to determine the effect of the pre-election campaign on
employee voting behavior. The authors' staff interviewed 1,239 employees who voted in 31
elections. Employees were interviewed as soon as possible after the beginning of the campaign
to ascertain their attitudes toward the union and the employer and their voting intent. The
second interview, conducted after the election, determined actual vote, issues remembered and

reasons given for voting choice. GETMAN, supra at 33.
65. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 53-64, 72.

66. Id. at 73-85.
67. Id. at 53-64, 73-85, 140-41.
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sumptions underlying the Board's campaign regulations. 68 The Board's
willingness to reexamine its regulations now that such a study has been done
must be commended. The treatment afforded the study in Shopping Kart,
however, illustrates the need for a more thorough analysis and scrutiny of
the data and a more cautious application of the study's results. The majority
accepted uncritically the study's conclusions, 6 9 despite conflicting data that
indicates that campaign speech may affect a significant minority of elections, perhaps a large enough number to warrant its continued regulation in
some form. For example, as the dissent noted, half the employees polled
were aware of union claims concerning wages elsewhere, and 22% recalled
the precise amount within 10%.7 0 Although the authors of the study concluded that the average employee was not "very" familiar with campaign
issues, 7 1 the averaging of employee recognition of significant issues with
insignificant ones arguably underemphasizes the consistent salience of certain key issues such as prospective plant closings, loss of benefits and
possible discharges (employer issues), and wages and working conditions
(union issues) that were recognized by 23 to 71% of all employees. 72 In
addition, the study's finding that union campaigns did in fact influence
voters who were exposed to them, 73 and the extensive shifting of votes in the
most successful union and company campaigns74 suggest that at least some
campaigns probably have an effect. By ignoring this data and other weak68. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 582; Bok, supra note 34, at 40,46-53, 88-90; Samoff,
supra note 53, at 233 n.15, 245.n.41; Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6
SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 106-08 (1955).
69. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
70. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion); see GETMAN, supra note 60, at 82,
71. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 107. The average employee could remember only 10% of
the company campaign issues and 7% of the union issues. Id. at 76.
72. Eight employer issues concerning loss of benefits, improvements not being dependent
on unionization, union dues and the destructive effects of unionization were recognized by 25
to 40% of the employees. Id. at 78-79. Six union issues generally concerning wages, working
conditions, benefits, grievances and union gains obtained elsewhere were recognized by 23 to
71% of the employees. Id. at 80-81. Additionally, certain issues were of critical importance in
individual campaigns, being recognized by as many as 89% of the employees. Id. at 82-83.
73. Among voters who were initially undecided and those who switched from one party to
the other, those who voted for the union were significantly more familiar with the union
campaign than were those who voted for the company, but those who voted for the company
were no more familiar with the company campaign than were those who voted for the union. Id.
at 103-09. This suggested to the authors a causal relationship between attendance at union
meetings, familiarity with the union campaign and vote switching to the union. Id.; see Eames,
An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist'sPoint of View, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1181, 1187 (1976).
74. In the five most successful company campaigns the average loss in union support from
the card-sign to the vote was 35%; in the most successful union campaigns, however, the unions
gained an average 10% from the card-sign to the vote. The authors could find no explanation for
these strong gains and losses. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 100-03; see Eames, supra note 73, at
1185-86; Miller, supra note 55, at 1164.
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nesses and inconsistencies in the study, 75 and selectively accepting the
study's conclusion concerning general employee behavior, the majority
avoided directly confronting several difficult issues. 7 6 It did not have to
make the difficult value judgment concerning how many elections must be
shown to be affected by campaign tactics in order to justify Board regulation. 77 Additionally, the majority did not have to consider whether the
Board's remedy of election invalidation is supported by any proof of the
Board's ability to identify8 those elections that have actually been influenced
7
by unfair campaigning.
75. A major weakness is that, although the votes of the 6% of the initially undecided
voters and the 13% of the voters who switched from one party to the other determined the
outcome of 9 of the 31 elections, GETMAN, supra note 60, at 103, the authors were unable to
determine what factors influenced the voters' decisions in those elections. Id. at 98; see Miller,
supra note 55, at 1168-69.
The study's conclusion that the campaign had no effect is inconsistent with the proposition
that the campaign probably strengthened latent voting predispositions, GEMAN, supra at 142,
since the strengthening of predispositions may be important in influencing employees' actual
votes. Miller, supra at 1187. In addition, the voting predispositions of a majority of employees
in some elections may be very weak because of lack of exposure to unions and absence of
strong feelings about the employer. In these elections the information received during the
campaign may have more impact on the voters' choice. See Flanagan, The BehavioralFoundations of Union Election Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (1976). With regard tb this
possibility, it seems significant that the majority of the voters studied by the Getman group had
had significant exposure to unions. GETMAN, supra at 66.
The conclusion that campaign violations do not influence voters is not consistent with two
previous studies of rerun elections that show that the probability of a different outcome in a
rerun depends, at least partially, on the type of violation reported in the first election. See
Drotning, NLRB Remedies for Election Misconduct: An Analysis of Election Outcomes and
Their Determinants, 40 U. Ci. J. Bus. 137 (1967); Pollitt, NLRB Re-run Elections:A Study, 41
N.C.L. REV. 209 (1963).
Despite these criticisms, the Getman study's general conclusions seem to be in accord with
other more limited studies of employee voting behavior. See Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail
Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LAB. L.J. 149 (1967) (primary determinants of
employee voting are previous union experience, general perceptions about unions and job
satisfaction); Comment, An Examination of Two Aspects of the NLRB RepresentationElection: Employee Attitudes and Board Inferences, 3 AKRON L. REV. 218 (1970) (positive experiences with management, satisfaction with working conditions, and perception of personal job
security are most critical in voting choice).
For favorable responses to the Getman study, see Flanagarr, supra;Raskin, Deregulation
of Union Campaigns:Restoring the FirstAmendment Balance, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (1976);
Goetz & Wike, Book Review, 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 375 (1977).
76. The dissent, in contrast to the majority, seized on the inconsistencies of the study and
94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10, 1712
seemingly rejected in toto its conclusions, 228 N.L.R.B. at -,-,
(dissenting opinions), thereby disregarding valuable information that, even if accepted only in
part or with reservations, suggests that some modification of the Board's misrepresentation
policy is needed.
The approaches of both the majority and the dissent illustrate that critical comment and
analysis from informed observers should be solicited before any further use of the study is
attempted. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 582; note 89 and accompanying text infra.
77. See Miller, supra note 55, at 1168-69 (we do not demand a cost-benefit analysis for all
worthwhile regulations in society, so we should not necessarily demand one in this area).
78. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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The majority's use of the Getman study in Shopping Kart also illustrates the danger that the study will be selectively applied by the Board in
isolated areas of its regulatory policy to overturn some election controls,
while others of equally questionable behavioral validity are preserved. This
type of selective use was apparent in the majority's decision to continue to
invalidate elections on the basis of forgeries and misrepresentations in which
one party has implied Board support for its position, 79 despite the fact that
the Getman study indicates that such tactics have no greater impact on
employee voting than do other campaign misrepresentations. 80 The decision
to continue to invalidate elections when Board neutrality has been misrepresented probably reflects the high value placed on Board impartiality and the
desire to maintain respect for the Board's operations. 81 The majority should
have considered, however, whether some method of enforcement other than
election invalidation would be preferable in these cases, for overturning
elections in which misrepresentations have probably not affected the out82
come actually frustrates employee freedom of choice.
The decision to continue to invalidate elections on the basis of forgeries
seems to have been motivated by a misunderstanding of the Getman study,
although unarticulated considerations may have influenced the decision.
The majority argued that employees are generally sophisticated about campaign misrepresentations but may be misled by misrepresentations made in
such a deceptive manner that even sophisticated voters could not recognize
their inaccuracy. 8 3 In using the Getman study as support for the proposition
that employees are not influenced by campaign propoganda because they are
sophisticated, however, the majority distorted the study's conclusions and
disregarded the study's finding of employee inattentiveness to the campaign. 4 It is also possible that the Board retained election regulations in
79. 228 N.L.R.B. at -,

94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.

80. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 150-53; see text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
81. The Board readily overturns elections in which official documents have been reproduced by unauthorized parties, even if the actual impact on the election is doubtful. See, e.g.,
Rebmar, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1968) (election invalidated because union had reproduced
Board's official election notice, despite the innocuous nature of the alteration); Allied Electric
Prods., Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1954) (upheld policy against reproducing official ballot so as to
not imply Board support for any particular party).

82. See GETMAN, supra note 60, at 113-18, 155 (suggesting Board's inability to make
impact determinations, and need for remedies other than election invalidation that would be
triggered automatically by election misconduct without regard to whether the misconduct had
had an impact on the election).
83. 228 N.L.R.B. at -,

94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.

84. The majority's emphasis on employee sophistication, id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707,
implies a view of employees weighing and evaluating information in a rational manner. The
Getman study found, on the other hand, that employees' votes were largely determined by

general attitudes towards unions and attitudes about working conditions. GETMAN, supra note
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cases involving forgeries because of the greater justification in punishing
such deliberate and intentional behavior 85 and the relatively greater ease in
determining when such violations have occurred. As with the decision
concerning violations of Board neutrality, however, the majority should
have considered other means of deterring such behavior than election invalidation.
-The inadequacy of the Board's analysis of the Getman study in Shopping Kart and the apparent unwillingness of both the majority and the
dissent to consider other approaches to campaign speech regulation, aside
from the general retention or abandonment of the Hollywood Ceramics
rules, illustrates the limitations of the Board's traditional adjudicatory approach to problems more amenable to rulemaking. 8 6 That policy analysis of
the type attempted in Shopping Kart is better conducted in accordance with
established rulemaking procedures8 7 rather than through adjudication has
been suggested by numerous Board critics. 8 The primary advantage of a
rulemaking approach is that it generally opens up the decisionmaking
process, thereby providing an opportunity for wide participation to all
interested parties and helping to assure a variety of inputs. 89 It also offers
60, at 54-64, 72. These findings, and the additional finding of employee inattentiveness to the
campaign, suggest that employee voting behavior, although not irrational, does not involve the
rational intake of new information in the sophisticated manner implied in the majority interpretation of the study. Id. at 143.
85. The courts have often considered the element of intentionality. NLRB v. Santee River
Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1976); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d
1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
86. Rulemaking, as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, is a process for "formulating, amending, or repealing" an "agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. §
551(4), (5) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The NLRB has preferred to develop substantive rules
through adjudication, even when general rules of widespread applicability have been articulated. See Peck, supra note 58, at 736-40.
87. Section 6 of the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes the Board to "make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1970); see note 89 infra.
88. See generally Baker, Policy by Rule orAd HocApproach-Which Should It Be?, 22 L.
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); Bernstein, supra note 58; Peck, supra note 58; Peck, A Critique
of the NationalLabor Relations Board's Performancein Policy Formulation:Adjudication and
Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Peck, A Critique]: Samoff,
Coping With the NLRB's Growing Caseload,22 LAB. L.J. 739 (1971); SAMOFF, supra note 53;
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Note, Administrative Law Making Through Adjudication:
The National LaborRelations Board, 45 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1961).
89. Rulemaking procedures include publication in the Federal Register of general notice of
the proposed rulemaking and hearing, a statement of the proposed substance of the suggested
rule, an opportunity for interested parties to submit written data and arguments with or without
oral presentation, and publication in the Federal Register of the rule as adopted. 5 U.S.C. §
553(a)-(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

404

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

greater flexibility in considering alternatives other than merely upholding or
overruling precedent. 90 For example, with regard to the difficulties of

regulating campaign misrepresentations noted in Shopping Kar, the critical
problem of prolonged litigation could have been considered in light of
possible administrative and procedural changes such as increasing the power
of Regional Directors and commensurately decreasing the scope of Board
review. 91 As an alternative to general deregulation, the Board could have
Although, as one critic has noted, following a rulemaking procedure will not in itself
guarantee that the Board actually will consider the opinions and testimony elicited, Bernstein,
supra note 58, at 593, such a procedure would at least ensure that a variety of opinions is
presented. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); Bernstein, supra at 591, 61618; Peck, supra note 58, at 756-57; Peck, A Critique,supra note 88, at 263; Shapiro, supra note
88, at 932. Such participation was notably lacking in Shopping Kart since the impending
reconsideration of Board policy was unannounced. See note 8 supra. Analysis of the type
described above may be critical with regard to the Getman study considering its unique nature,
its scope and its potential impact on other areas of Board election regulation. See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra. Participation of affected parties increases the probability that
defects in proposed rules will be noted before the rules are adopted. Peck, A Critique, supra at
272, and that interrelationships with other rules will be studied, Bernstein, supra at 591.
Additionally, "[Iln rulemaking, all potentially affected have the opportunity to shape the initial
decision before the agency attitude hardens, whereas adjudication often burdens nonparties
with persuading the agency to overrule or modify a precedent." Id.
The proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). passed
by the House of Representatives on Oct. 6, 1977, 123 CoO. REC. HI0,713 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1977), and awaiting Senate action in 1978, requires the Board to make rules governing when
election misconduct will be grounds for election invalidation. H.R. 8410 § 5, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). See 123 CONG. REC. H10,702-14 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977); id. H10,630-79 (daily ed.
Oct. 5, 1977); and id. H10,540-63 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977) for debate on the various provisions
of the bill.
90. See Peck, A Critique, supra note 88, at 272.
91. Limiting the scope of Board review and reducing court review of Board decisions
would tend to accelerate ultimate resolution of cases. Both possibilities, of course, would be
strongly opposed by some parties on grounds of due process. As Chairman Fanning has noted,
"One man's unconscionable delay is another's due process. Where one shades into the other is
a perception much influenced by where you sit." Speech by John Fanning, supra note 52,
reported in [1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), at 383.
The proposed Labor Reform Act, discussed at note 89 supra, includes various provisions
that would ameliorate the difficulty in achieving final results in disputed elections within a
reasonable time. The provisions include setting time limits for parties to appeal adverse Board
decisions, cutting back, though not eliminating, court review of Board decisions involving
certification and increasing the number of Board members from five to seven. H.R. 8410 §§ 2,
6, 9, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The special task force appointed to investigate and recommend changes in NLRB procedure considered various procedural changes that would accelerate the filing procedure on
objections, increase the burden on the objecting party to show substantiating evidence at an
early stage in the objection process, allow for parties to waive the right of review, eliminate as a
basis for review the ground that a substantial factual issue was clearly decided erroneously and
increase the power of Regional Directors to issue decisions in all cases subject to limited
review. INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE ON THE

NLRB FOR 1976, at 18-30 (1976).
The Board also could reduce the possibility of parties using its regulations in order to delay
bargaining by providing for expedited review of objections brought by parties with a history of
filing objections.

1978]

UNION ELECTIONS

405

established threshold requirements for Board intervention in misrepresentation cases, thereby eliminating Board intervention in numerous cases, setting clearer guidelines for election conduct and preserving Board control
in
92
cases in which misrepresentations are most likely to have an impact.
A rulemaking approach would also have enabled the Board to consider
each facet of its election controls within the context of a comprehensive and
complementary regulatory scheme. Comprehensive policy examination of
this nature is impelled by the Getman study93 and by the fact that the Board's
regulation of other campaign practices has produced many of the same
problems as its now-discarded controls over misrepresentations. 94 Moreover, the Board's policies in various areas of campaign regulation are intimately connected and therefore should be considered together. For example, the
policy of providing unions limited access to employer premises serves a goal
similar to that of the Board's regulation of campaign misconduct: both
policies have as their overriding purpose the effectuation of a free and
informed voter choice. 95 Abandonment of controls over misrepresentations
might have been more justifiable had the Board concurrently taken positive
action to provide unions with equal access to employer premises 96 -a step
92. One threshold suggested by the results of the Getman study is for the Board to
consider only cases in which the margin of victory is smaller than 20%. GETMAN, supra note 60,
at 150 n.21; see Bok, supra note 34, at 91. Such a policy is supported by studies indicating that

the original margin of victory is the most important factor in determining whether there is a
different outcome in a rerun election. See Drotning, supra note 75, at 142; Pollitt, supra note
75, at 220.
The Board also could refuse to hear claims concerning misrepresentation made within
three working days of the election, thereby putting greater responsibility on the parties themselves to police the campaign. Additionally, the Board could refuse to examine ambiguous
statements, see Bok, supra at 91, and any misrepresentation made to less than a Boarddetermined percentage of the employees in a unit. It could also limit review to misrepresentations about certain key issues, absent substantial proof by the complaining party that a unique
or usually minor issue was important in a given campaign. See GETMAN, supra at 78-79, and
note 72 and accompanying text supra, for a summary of which issues are generally important in
campaigns. These thresholds could be determined in light of the Board's 25 years of experience
with misrepresentation charges.
93. The study recommends deregulation of speech, including threats and promises, misrepresentations, interrogation, emotional appeals and speeches made to massed groups of employees within 24 hours of the election. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 146-50.
94. The Board's regulation of inflammatory, emotional appeals, illegal threats and promises and illegal discharges, among others, requires that the Board make very subjective determinations concerning either motive or impact. For the problems of making impact judgments, see
notes 37-38, 41, 44-47 and text accompanying notes 34-47 supra.
95. The Board's policy of requiring employers to disclose names and addresses of their
employees is predicated on the policy of enhancing the probability of a free and reasoned
choice. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
96. The need for greater access is shown by the Getman study's finding that, although
unions were furnished with employees' names and addresses and could conduct meetings off
the employer's premises, employee exposure to the union campaign was significantly less than
employee exposure to the company campaign. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 96, 143-44, 156-59.
Many commentators have advocated greater union access to employer premises as an alterna-
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supported both by considerations of fairness and by the desirability of
maximizing the opportunity to rebut misinformation. 97 Significantly, in
Shopping Kart the Board ignored the fact that the Getman study's recommendations with regard to deregulation were made in the context of other
proposals advocating equal access to company premises 98 and stronger
remedies for other types of campaign misconduct. 99
The outlines of the Board's new policy of not examining alleged
campaign misrepresentations are still somewhat unclear given ex-Chairman
Murphy's failure to more precisely define standards for the "egregious"
misrepresentations that will continue to be grounds for setting aside an
election.'0 Indications are, however, that Board intervention will occur
only when the misrepresentation approaches actual fraud.' 0' If Shopping
Kart is not overruled,' 2 the primary effect of the decision will be to
eliminate a basis for objection to election results that has been used to
unduly prolong litigation and delay bargaining in hundreds of cases every
year. The decision also eliminates the need for the Board to make difficult
impact determinations in one category of election cases. There is, however,
the possibility that the general deregulation of election speech will result in
an escalation of propaganda in some elections, though probably only a
minority. In cases in which such an escalation occurs, unions will probably
be at a decided disadvantage because their access to employees is generally
more restricted than is management's, and thus their opportunity to rebut is
more limited.
Despite these potential problems, Shopping Kart illustrates a healthy
willingness on the part of the Board to reexamine, on the basis of new
behavioral data, long-held assumptions and the policies they have previoustive to strict campaign regulation. See Bok, supra note 34, at 91-92; Samoff, supra note 53, at
239, 248-50. A provision mandating that the Board formulate rules providing for greater union
access to employees is included in the proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977. H.R. 8410 § 3, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), discussed at note 89 supra.
97. See GETMAN, supra note 60, at 157; Bok, supra note 34, at 52-56, 91-92.
98. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 157; see Speech by Stephen Goldberg to Labor Relations
Law Section of ABA (Aug. 6, 1977), reported in [1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 390
(Goldberg, co-author of the Getman study, emphasized the fact that the suggested changes

were not to be considered in isolation).
99. See GETMAN, supra note 60, at 113-18, 151-55; Speech by Stephen Goldberg, supra
note 98.

100. See note 19 supra.
101.

In a case arising after Shopping Kart, Murphy indicated that an "egregious" mistake

of fact might have to amount to fraud in order to invalidate an election. Thomas E. Gates &
Sons, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. No. 100, at -

n.6, 95 L,R.R.M. 1198, 1199 n.6 (May 17, 1977).

102. Since Shopping Kart was decided, Peter Walther resigned from the Board and was
replaced by John Truesdale, who, along with Fanning and Jenkins, could constitute the
majority needed to overrule Shopping Kart.
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ly supported. It is also encouraging that the established misrepresentation
policy was overturned on the basis of the Board's experience with the
practical consequences of the Hollywood Ceramics rules rather than as a
result of political changes in the Board's composition.1 3 The decision, in
conjunction with the challenge to the foundation of existing campaign
regulations presented by the Getman study, 104 raises the possibility that the
Board will reexamine other election regulations that exhibit many of the
characteristics of the Hollywood Ceramics standards. 10 5 Shopping Kart
demonstrates, however, that such a reexamination should be made only after
a more thoughtful analysis of the Getman study. Shopping Kart also
illustrates the desirability of effectuating any further changes in existing
campaign standards through rulemaking proceedings, rather than through
adjudication. Such an approach would provide a wider forum for discussion
and analysis of the Getman study and of controversial changes. A rulemaking approach would also allow for the establishment of regulatory priorities,
the consideration of remedies other than election invalidation, the alteration
of administrative and procedural practices where necessary and the concurrent examination of the issue of access and other means of promoting the
goal of enhancing informed voter choice.
KAREN SINDELAR
103. Most policy changes effected by the Board have resulted from changes in the Board's

composition. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 597; Wirtz, supra note 28, at 611-12. This has
been especially true in the politically sensitive area of "free speech." Hickey, StareDecisisand
the NLRB, 17 LAB. L.J. 451, 462 (1966).

104. See note 93 supra.
105. See note 94 supra. Although the Board may not be willing to eliminate its election

regulations to the extent suggested by the Getman study, the rationale of Shopping Kart, that
employees are generally sophisticated enough to protect themselves from campaign propaganda and that employees are largely uninfluenced by such propaganda anyway, would at least

support the abandonment of other regulations justified only by the GeneralShoe doctrine,, see
note 28 and text accompanying notes 26-28 supra, rather than by specific statutory prohibition.

For example, despite the majority's express indication that it will continue to oversee campaign
conduct other than misrepresentations, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708, it is difficult
to see how the Board can continue to overturn elections on the basis of appeals to racial or

religious prejudices, see, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).

